Local Copy of http://eserver.org/history/peloponesian-war.txt
431 BC
by Thucydides
translated by Richard Crawley
The First Book.
THUCYDIDES,
an Athenian, wrote the history of the war between the Peloponnesians and the
Athenians, beginning at the moment that it broke out, and believing that it
would be a great war and more worthy of relation than any that had preceded it.
This belief was not without its grounds. The preparations of both the
combatants were in every department in the last state of perfection; and he
could see the rest of the Hellenic race taking sides in the quarrel; those who
delayed doing so at once having it in contemplation. Indeed this was the
greatest movement yet known in history, not only of the Hellenes, but of a
large part of the barbarian world- I had almost said of mankind. For though the
events of remote antiquity, and even those that more immediately preceded the
war, could not from lapse of time be clearly ascertained, yet the evidences
which an inquiry carried as far back as was practicable leads me to trust, all
point to the conclusion that there was nothing on a great scale, either in war
or in other matters.
For
instance, it is evident that the country now called Hellas had in ancient times
no settled population; on the contrary, migrations were of frequent occurrence,
the several tribes readily abandoning their homes under the pressure of
superior numbers. Without commerce, without freedom of communication either by
land or sea, cultivating no more of their territory than the exigencies of life
required, destitute of capital, never planting their land (for they could not
tell when an invader might not come and take it all away, and when he did come
they had no walls to stop him), thinking that the necessities of daily
sustenance could be supplied at one place as well as another, they cared little
for shifting their habitation, and consequently neither built large cities nor
attained to any other form of greatness. The richest soils were always most
subject to this change of masters; such as the district now called Thessaly,
Boeotia, most of the Peloponnese, Arcadia excepted, and the most fertile parts
of the rest of Hellas. The goodness of the land favoured the aggrandizement of
particular individuals, and thus created faction which proved a fertile source
of ruin. It also invited invasion. Accordingly Attica, from the poverty of its
soil enjoying from a very remote period freedom from faction, never changed its
inhabitants. And here is no inconsiderable exemplification of my assertion that
the migrations were the cause of there being no correspondent growth in other
parts. The most powerful victims of war or faction from the rest of Hellas took
refuge with the Athenians as a safe retreat; and at an early period, becoming
naturalized, swelled the already large population of the city to such a height
that Attica became at last too small to hold them, and they had to send out
colonies to Ionia.
There
is also another circumstance that contributes not a little to my conviction of
the weakness of ancient times. Before the Trojan war there is no indication of
any common action in Hellas, nor indeed of the universal prevalence of the
name; on the contrary, before the time of Hellen, son of Deucalion, no such
appellation existed, but the country went by the names of the different tribes,
in particular of the Pelasgian. It was not till Hellen and his sons grew strong
in Phthiotis, and were invited as allies into the other cities, that one by one
they gradually acquired from the connection the name of Hellenes; though a long
time elapsed before that name could fasten itself upon all. The best proof of
this is furnished by Homer. Born long after the Trojan War, he nowhere calls
all of them by that name, nor indeed any of them except the followers of
Achilles from Phthiotis, who were the original Hellenes: in his poems they are
called Danaans, Argives, and Achaeans. He does not even use the term barbarian,
probably because the Hellenes had not yet been marked off from the rest of the
world by one distinctive appellation. It appears therefore that the several
Hellenic communities, comprising not only those who first acquired the name,
city by city, as they came to understand each other, but also those who assumed
it afterwards as the name of the whole people, were before the Trojan war
prevented by their want of strength and the absence of mutual intercourse from
displaying any collective action.
Indeed,
they could not unite for this expedition till they had gained increased
familiarity with the sea. And the first person known to us by tradition as
having established a navy is Minos. He made himself master of what is now
called the Hellenic sea, and ruled over the Cyclades, into most of which he
sent the first colonies, expelling the Carians and appointing his own sons
governors; and thus did his best to put down piracy in those waters, a
necessary step to secure the revenues for his own use.
For
in early times the Hellenes and the barbarians of the coast and islands, as
communication by sea became more common, were tempted to turn pirates, under
the conduct of their most powerful men; the motives being to serve their own
cupidity and to support the needy. They would fall upon a town unprotected by
walls, and consisting of a mere collection of villages, and would plunder it;
indeed, this came to be the main source of their livelihood, no disgrace being
yet attached to such an achievement, but even some glory. An illustration of
this is furnished by the honour with which some of the inhabitants of the
continent still regard a successful marauder, and by the question we find the
old poets everywhere representing the people as asking of voyagers- "Are they
pirates?"- as if those who are asked the question would have no idea of
disclaiming the imputation, or their interrogators of reproaching them for it.
The same rapine prevailed also by land.
And
even at the present day many of Hellas still follow the old fashion, the
Ozolian Locrians for instance, the Aetolians, the Acarnanians, and that region
of the continent; and the custom of carrying arms is still kept up among these
continentals, from the old piratical habits. The whole of Hellas used once to
carry arms, their habitations being unprotected and their communication with
each other unsafe; indeed, to wear arms was as much a part of everyday life
with them as with the barbarians. And the fact that the people in these parts
of Hellas are still living in the old way points to a time when the same mode
of life was once equally common to all. The Athenians were the first to lay
aside their weapons, and to adopt an easier and more luxurious mode of life;
indeed, it is only lately that their rich old men left off the luxury of
wearing undergarments of linen, and fastening a knot of their hair with a tie
of golden grasshoppers, a fashion which spread to their Ionian kindred and long
prevailed among the old men there. On the contrary, a modest style of dressing,
more in conformity with modern ideas, was first adopted by the Lacedaemonians,
the rich doing their best to assimilate their way of life to that of the common
people. They also set the example of contending naked, publicly stripping and
anointing themselves with oil in their gymnastic exercises. Formerly, even in
the Olympic contests, the athletes who contended wore belts across their
middles; and it is but a few years since that the practice ceased. To this day
among some of the barbarians, especially in Asia, when prizes for boxing and
wrestling are offered, belts are worn by the combatants. And there are many
other points in which a likeness might be shown between the life of the
Hellenic world of old and the barbarian of to-day.
With
respect to their towns, later on, at an era of increased facilities of
navigation and a greater supply of capital, we find the shores becoming the
site of walled towns, and the isthmuses being occupied for the purposes of
commerce and defence against a neighbour. But the old towns, on account of the
great prevalence of piracy, were built away from the sea, whether on the
islands or the continent, and still remain in their old sites. For the pirates
used to plunder one another, and indeed all coast populations, whether
seafaring or not.
The
islanders, too, were great pirates. These islanders were Carians and
Phoenicians, by whom most of the islands were colonized, as was proved by the
following fact. During the purification of Delos by Athens in this war all the
graves in the island were taken up, and it was found that above half their
inmates were Carians: they were identified by the fashion of the arms buried
with them, and by the method of interment, which was the same as the Carians
still follow. But as soon as Minos had formed his navy, communication by sea
became easier, as he colonized most of the islands, and thus expelled the
malefactors. The coast population now began to apply themselves more closely to
the acquisition of wealth, and their life became more settled; some even began
to build themselves walls on the strength of their newly acquired riches. For
the love of gain would reconcile the weaker to the dominion of the stronger,
and the possession of capital enabled the more powerful to reduce the smaller
towns to subjection. And it was at a somewhat later stage of this development
that they went on the expedition against Troy.
What
enabled Agamemnon to raise the armament was more, in my opinion, his
superiority in strength, than the oaths of Tyndareus, which bound the suitors
to follow him. Indeed, the account given by those Peloponnesians who have been
the recipients of the most credible tradition is this. First of all Pelops,
arriving among a needy population from Asia with vast wealth, acquired such
power that, stranger though he was, the country was called after him; and this
power fortune saw fit materially to increase in the hands of his descendants.
Eurystheus had been killed in Attica by the Heraclids. Atreus was his mother's
brother; and to the hands of his relation, who had left his father on account
of the death of Chrysippus, Eurystheus, when he set out on his expedition, had
committed Mycenae and the government. As time went on and Eurystheus did not return,
Atreus complied with the wishes of the Mycenaeans, who were influenced by fear
of the Heraclids- besides, his power seemed considerable, and he had not
neglected to court the favour of the populace- and assumed the sceptre of
Mycenae and the rest of the dominions of Eurystheus. And so the power of the
descendants of Pelops came to be greater than that of the descendants of
Perseus. To all this Agamemnon succeeded. He had also a navy far stronger than
his contemporaries, so that, in my opinion, fear was quite as strong an element
as love in the formation of the confederate expedition. The strength of his
navy is shown by the fact that his own was the largest contingent, and that of
the Arcadians was furnished by him; this at least is what Homer says, if his
testimony is deemed sufficient. Besides, in his account of the transmission of
the sceptre, he calls him
Of many an isle, and of all Argos king.
Now
Agamemnon's was a continental power; and he could not have been master of any
except the adjacent islands (and these would not be many), but through the
possession of a fleet.
And
from this expedition we may infer the character of earlier enterprises. Now
Mycenae may have been a small place, and many of the towns of that age may
appear comparatively insignificant, but no exact observer would therefore feel
justified in rejecting the estimate given by the poets and by tradition of the
magnitude of the armament. For I suppose if Lacedaemon were to become desolate,
and the temples and the foundations of the public buildings were left, that as
time went on there would be a strong disposition with posterity to refuse to
accept her fame as a true exponent of her power. And yet they occupy two-fifths
of Peloponnese and lead the whole, not to speak of their numerous allies
without. Still, as the city is neither built in a compact form nor adorned with
magnificent temples and public edifices, but composed of villages after the old
fashion of Hellas, there would be an impression of inadequacy. Whereas, if
Athens were to suffer the same misfortune, I suppose that any inference from
the appearance presented to the eye would make her power to have been twice as
great as it is. We have therefore no right to be sceptical, nor to content
ourselves with an inspection of a town to the exclusion of a consideration of
its power; but we may safely conclude that the armament in question surpassed
all before it, as it fell short of modern efforts; if we can here also accept
the testimony of Homer's poems, in which, without allowing for the exaggeration
which a poet would feel himself licensed to employ, we can see that it was far
from equalling ours. He has represented it as consisting of twelve hundred
vessels; the Boeotian complement of each ship being a hundred and twenty men, that
of the ships of Philoctetes fifty. By this, I conceive, he meant to convey the
maximum and the minimum complement: at any rate, he does not specify the amount
of any others in his catalogue of the ships. That they were all rowers as well
as warriors we see from his account of the ships of Philoctetes, in which all
the men at the oar are bowmen. Now it is improbable that many supernumeraries
sailed, if we except the kings and high officers; especially as they had to
cross the open sea with munitions of war, in ships, moreover, that had no
decks, but were equipped in the old piratical fashion. So that if we strike the
average of the largest and smallest ships, the number of those who sailed will
appear inconsiderable, representing, as they did, the whole force of Hellas.
And this was due not so much to scarcity of men as of money. Difficulty of
subsistence made the invaders reduce the numbers of the army to a point at
which it might live on the country during the prosecution of the war. Even
after the victory they obtained on their arrival- and a victory there must have
been, or the fortifications of the naval camp could never have been built-
there is no indication of their whole force having been employed; on the
contrary, they seem to have turned to cultivation of the Chersonese and to
piracy from want of supplies. This was what really enabled the Trojans to keep
the field for ten years against them; the dispersion of the enemy making them
always a match for the detachment left behind. If they had brought plenty of
supplies with them, and had persevered in the war without scattering for piracy
and agriculture, they would have easily defeated the Trojans in the field,
since they could hold their own against them with the division on service. In
short, if they had stuck to the siege, the capture of Troy would have cost them
less time and less trouble. But as want of money proved the weakness of earlier
expeditions, so from the same cause even the one in question, more famous than
its predecessors, may be pronounced on the evidence of what it effected to have
been inferior to its renown and to the current opinion about it formed under
the tuition of the poets.
Even
after the Trojan War, Hellas was still engaged in removing and settling, and
thus could not attain to the quiet which must precede growth. The late return
of the Hellenes from Ilium caused many revolutions, and factions ensued almost
everywhere; and it was the citizens thus driven into exile who founded the
cities. Sixty years after the capture of Ilium, the modern Boeotians were
driven out of Arne by the Thessalians, and settled in the present Boeotia, the
former Cadmeis; though there was a division of them there before, some of whom
joined the expedition to Ilium. Twenty years later, the Dorians and the
Heraclids became masters of Peloponnese; so that much had to be done and many
years had to elapse before Hellas could attain to a durable tranquillity
undisturbed by removals, and could begin to send out colonies, as Athens did to
Ionia and most of the islands, and the Peloponnesians to most of Italy and
Sicily and some places in the rest of Hellas. All these places were founded
subsequently to the war with Troy.
But
as the power of Hellas grew, and the acquisition of wealth became more an
object, the revenues of the states increasing, tyrannies were by their means
established almost everywhere- the old form of government being hereditary
monarchy with definite prerogatives- and Hellas began to fit out fleets and
apply herself more closely to the sea. It is said that the Corinthians were the
first to approach the modern style of naval architecture, and that Corinth was
the first place in Hellas where galleys were built; and we have Ameinocles, a
Corinthian shipwright, making four ships for the Samians. Dating from the end
of this war, it is nearly three hundred years ago that Ameinocles went to
Samos. Again, the earliest sea-fight in history was between the Corinthians and
Corcyraeans; this was about two hundred and sixty years ago, dating from the
same time. Planted on an isthmus, Corinth had from time out of mind been a
commercial emporium; as formerly almost all communication between the Hellenes
within and without Peloponnese was carried on overland, and the Corinthian
territory was the highway through which it travelled. She had consequently
great money resources, as is shown by the epithet "wealthy" bestowed
by the old poets on the place, and this enabled her, when traffic by sea became
more common, to procure her navy and put down piracy; and as she could offer a
mart for both branches of the trade, she acquired for herself all the power
which a large revenue affords. Subsequently the Ionians attained to great naval
strength in the reign of Cyrus, the first king of the Persians, and of his son
Cambyses, and while they were at war with the former commanded for a while the
Ionian sea. Polycrates also, the tyrant of Samos, had a powerful navy in the
reign of Cambyses, with which he reduced many of the islands, and among them
Rhenea, which he consecrated to the Delian Apollo. About this time also the
Phocaeans, while they were founding Marseilles, defeated the Carthaginians in a
sea-fight. These were the most powerful navies. And even these, although so
many generations had elapsed since the Trojan war, seem to have been
principally composed of the old fifty-oars and long-boats, and to have counted
few galleys among their ranks. Indeed it was only shortly the Persian war, and
the death of Darius the successor of Cambyses, that the Sicilian tyrants and
the Corcyraeans acquired any large number of galleys. For after these there
were no navies of any account in Hellas till the expedition of Xerxes; Aegina,
Athens, and others may have possessed a few vessels, but they were principally
fifty-oars. It was quite at the end of this period that the war with Aegina and
the prospect of the barbarian invasion enabled Themistocles to persuade the
Athenians to build the fleet with which they fought at Salamis; and even these
vessels had not complete decks.
The
navies, then, of the Hellenes during the period we have traversed were what I
have described. All their insignificance did not prevent their being an element
of the greatest power to those who cultivated them, alike in revenue and in
dominion. They were the means by which the islands were reached and reduced,
those of the smallest area falling the easiest prey. Wars by land there were
none, none at least by which power was acquired; we have the usual border
contests, but of distant expeditions with conquest for object we hear nothing
among the Hellenes. There was no union of subject cities round a great state,
no spontaneous combination of equals for confederate expeditions; what fighting
there was consisted merely of local warfare between rival neighbours. The
nearest approach to a coalition took place in the old war between Chalcis and
Eretria; this was a quarrel in which the rest of the Hellenic name did to some
extent take sides.
Various,
too, were the obstacles which the national growth encountered in various
localities. The power of the Ionians was advancing with rapid strides, when it
came into collision with Persia, under King Cyrus, who, after having dethroned
Croesus and overrun everything between the Halys and the sea, stopped not till
he had reduced the cities of the coast; the islands being only left to be
subdued by Darius and the Phoenician navy.
Again,
wherever there were tyrants, their habit of providing simply for themselves, of
looking solely to their personal comfort and family aggrandizement, made safety
the great aim of their policy, and prevented anything great proceeding from
them; though they would each have their affairs with their immediate
neighbours. All this is only true of the mother country, for in Sicily they
attained to very great power. Thus for a long time everywhere in Hellas do we
find causes which make the states alike incapable of combination for great and
national ends, or of any vigorous action of their own.
But
at last a time came when the tyrants of Athens and the far older tyrannies of
the rest of Hellas were, with the exception of those in Sicily, once and for
all put down by Lacedaemon; for this city, though after the settlement of the
Dorians, its present inhabitants, it suffered from factions for an unparalleled
length of time, still at a very early period obtained good laws, and enjoyed a
freedom from tyrants which was unbroken; it has possessed the same form of
government for more than four hundred years, reckoning to the end of the late
war, and has thus been in a position to arrange the affairs of the other
states. Not many years after the deposition of the tyrants, the battle of
Marathon was fought between the Medes and the Athenians. Ten years afterwards,
the barbarian returned with the armada for the subjugation of Hellas. In the
face of this great danger, the command of the confederate Hellenes was assumed
by the Lacedaemonians in virtue of their superior power; and the Athenians,
having made up their minds to abandon their city, broke up their homes, threw
themselves into their ships, and became a naval people. This coalition, after
repulsing the barbarian, soon afterwards split into two sections, which
included the Hellenes who had revolted from the King, as well as those who had
aided him in the war. At the end of the one stood Athens, at the head of the
other Lacedaemon, one the first naval, the other the first military power in
Hellas. For a short time the league held together, till the Lacedaemonians and
Athenians quarrelled and made war upon each other with their allies, a duel
into which all the Hellenes sooner or later were drawn, though some might at
first remain neutral. So that the whole period from the Median war to this,
with some peaceful intervals, was spent by each power in war, either with its
rival, or with its own revolted allies, and consequently afforded them constant
practice in military matters, and that experience which is learnt in the school
of danger.
The
policy of Lacedaemon was not to exact tribute from her allies, but merely to
secure their subservience to her interests by establishing oligarchies among
them; Athens, on the contrary, had by degrees deprived hers of their ships, and
imposed instead contributions in money on all except Chios and Lesbos. Both
found their resources for this war separately to exceed the sum of their
strength when the alliance flourished intact.
Having
now given the result of my inquiries into early times, I grant that there will
be a difficulty in believing every particular detail. The way that most men
deal with traditions, even traditions of their own country, is to receive them
all alike as they are delivered, without applying any critical test whatever.
The general Athenian public fancy that Hipparchus was tyrant when he fell by
the hands of Harmodius and Aristogiton, not knowing that Hippias, the eldest of
the sons of Pisistratus, was really supreme, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus
were his brothers; and that Harmodius and Aristogiton suspecting, on the very
day, nay at the very moment fixed on for the deed, that information had been
conveyed to Hippias by their accomplices, concluded that he had been warned,
and did not attack him, yet, not liking to be apprehended and risk their lives
for nothing, fell upon Hipparchus near the temple of the daughters of Leos, and
slew him as he was arranging the Panathenaic procession.
There
are many other unfounded ideas current among the rest of the Hellenes, even on
matters of contemporary history, which have not been obscured by time. For
instance, there is the notion that the Lacedaemonian kings have two votes each,
the fact being that they have only one; and that there is a company of Pitane,
there being simply no such thing. So little pains do the vulgar take in the
investigation of truth, accepting readily the first story that comes to hand.
On the whole, however, the conclusions I have drawn from the proofs quoted may,
I believe, safely be relied on. Assuredly they will not be disturbed either by
the lays of a poet displaying the exaggeration of his craft, or by the
compositions of the chroniclers that are attractive at truth's expense; the
subjects they treat of being out of the reach of evidence, and time having
robbed most of them of historical value by enthroning them in the region of
legend. Turning from these, we can rest satisfied with having proceeded upon
the clearest data, and having arrived at conclusions as exact as can be
expected in matters of such antiquity. To come to this war: despite the known
disposition of the actors in a struggle to overrate its importance, and when it
is over to return to their admiration of earlier events, yet an examination of
the facts will show that it was much greater than the wars which preceded it.
With
reference to the speeches in this history, some were delivered before the war
began, others while it was going on; some I heard myself, others I got from
various quarters; it was in all cases difficult to carry them word for word in
one's memory, so my habit has been to make the speakers say what was in my
opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of course adhering as
closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said. And with
reference to the narrative of events, far from permitting myself to derive it
from the first source that came to hand, I did not even trust my own
impressions, but it rests partly on what I saw myself, partly on what others
saw for me, the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe
and detailed tests possible. My conclusions have cost me some labour from the
want of coincidence between accounts of the same occurrences by different
eye-witnesses, arising sometimes from imperfect memory, sometimes from undue
partiality for one side or the other. The absence of romance in my history
will, I fear, detract somewhat from its interest; but if it be judged useful by
those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the
interpretation of the future, which in the course of human things must resemble
if it does not reflect it, I shall be content. In fine, I have written my work,
not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but as a possession
for all time.
The
Median War, the greatest achievement of past times, yet found a speedy decision
in two actions by sea and two by land. The Peloponnesian War was prolonged to
an immense length, and, long as it was, it was short without parallel for the
misfortunes that it brought upon Hellas. Never had so many cities been taken
and laid desolate, here by the barbarians, here by the parties contending (the
old inhabitants being sometimes removed to make room for others); never was
there so much banishing and blood-shedding, now on the field of battle, now in
the strife of faction. Old stories of occurrences handed down by tradition, but
scantily confirmed by experience, suddenly ceased to be incredible; there were
earthquakes of unparalleled extent and violence; eclipses of the sun occurred
with a frequency unrecorded in previous history; there were great droughts in
sundry places and consequent famines, and that most calamitous and awfully
fatal visitation, the plague. All this came upon them with the late war, which
was begun by the Athenians and Peloponnesians by the dissolution of the thirty
years' truce made after the conquest of Euboea. To the question why they broke
the treaty, I answer by placing first an account of their grounds of complaint
and points of difference, that no one may ever have to ask the immediate cause
which plunged the Hellenes into a war of such magnitude. The real cause I
consider to be the one which was formally most kept out of sight. The growth of
the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon, made war
inevitable. Still it is well to give the grounds alleged by either side which
led to the dissolution of the treaty and the breaking out of the war.
THE
city of Epidamnus stands on the right of the entrance of the Ionic Gulf. Its
vicinity is inhabited by the Taulantians, an Illyrian people. The place is a
colony from Corcyra, founded by Phalius, son of Eratocleides, of the family of
the Heraclids, who had according to ancient usage been summoned for the purpose
from Corinth, the mother country. The colonists were joined by some
Corinthians, and others of the Dorian race. Now, as time went on, the city of
Epidamnus became great and populous; but falling a prey to factions arising, it
is said, from a war with her neighbours the barbarians, she became much
enfeebled, and lost a considerable amount of her power. The last act before the
war was the expulsion of the nobles by the people. The exiled party joined the
barbarians, and proceeded to plunder those in the city by sea and land; and the
Epidamnians, finding themselves hard pressed, sent ambassadors to Corcyra
beseeching their mother country not to allow them to perish, but to make up
matters between them and the exiles, and to rid them of the war with the
barbarians. The ambassadors seated themselves in the temple of Hera as
suppliants, and made the above requests to the Corcyraeans. But the Corcyraeans
refused to accept their supplication, and they were dismissed without having
effected anything.
When
the Epidamnians found that no help could be expected from Corcyra, they were in
a strait what to do next. So they sent to Delphi and inquired of the God
whether they should deliver their city to the Corinthians and endeavour to
obtain some assistance from their founders. The answer he gave them was to
deliver the city and place themselves under Corinthian protection. So the
Epidamnians went to Corinth and delivered over the colony in obedience to the
commands of the oracle. They showed that their founder came from Corinth, and
revealed the answer of the god; and they begged them not to allow them to
perish, but to assist them. This the Corinthians consented to do. Believing the
colony to belong as much to themselves as to the Corcyraeans, they felt it to
be a kind of duty to undertake their protection. Besides, they hated the
Corcyraeans for their contempt of the mother country. Instead of meeting with
the usual honours accorded to the parent city by every other colony at public
assemblies, such as precedence at sacrifices, Corinth found herself treated
with contempt by a power which in point of wealth could stand comparison with
any even of the richest communities in Hellas, which possessed great military
strength, and which sometimes could not repress a pride in the high naval
position of an, island whose nautical renown dated from the days of its old
inhabitants, the Phaeacians. This was one reason of the care that they lavished
on their fleet, which became very efficient; indeed they began the war with a
force of a hundred and twenty galleys.
All
these grievances made Corinth eager to send the promised aid to Epidamnus.
Advertisement was made for volunteer settlers, and a force of Ambraciots,
Leucadians, and Corinthians was dispatched. They marched by land to Apollonia,
a Corinthian colony, the route by sea being avoided from fear of Corcyraean interruption.
When the Corcyraeans heard of the arrival of the settlers and troops in
Epidamnus, and the surrender of the colony to Corinth, they took fire.
Instantly putting to sea with five-and-twenty ships, which were quickly
followed by others, they insolently commanded the Epidamnians to receive back
the banished nobles- (it must be premised that the Epidamnian exiles had come
to Corcyra and, pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors, had appealed to
their kindred to restore them)- and to dismiss the Corinthian garrison and
settlers. But to all this the Epidamnians turned a deaf ear. Upon this the
Corcyraeans commenced operations against them with a fleet of forty sail. They
took with them the exiles, with a view to their restoration, and also secured the
services of the Illyrians. Sitting down before the city, they issued a
proclamation to the effect that any of the natives that chose, and the
foreigners, might depart unharmed, with the alternative of being treated as
enemies. On their refusal the Corcyraeans proceeded to besiege the city, which
stands on an isthmus; and the Corinthians, receiving intelligence of the
investment of Epidamnus, got together an armament and proclaimed a colony to
Epidamnus, perfect political equality being guaranteed to all who chose to go.
Any who were not prepared to sail at once might, by paying down the sum of
fifty Corinthian drachmae, have a share in the colony without leaving Corinth.
Great numbers took advantage of this proclamation, some being ready to start
directly, others paying the requisite forfeit. In case of their passage being
disputed by the Corcyraeans, several cities were asked to lend them a convoy.
Megara prepared to accompany them with eight ships, Pale in Cephallonia with
four; Epidaurus furnished five, Hermione one, Troezen two, Leucas ten, and
Ambracia eight. The Thebans and Phliasians were asked for money, the Eleans for
hulls as well; while Corinth herself furnished thirty ships and three thousand
heavy infantry.
When
the Corcyraeans heard of their preparations they came to Corinth with envoys
from Lacedaemon and Sicyon, whom they persuaded to accompany them, and bade her
recall the garrison and settlers, as she had nothing to do with Epidamnus. If,
however, she had any claims to make, they were willing to submit the matter to
the arbitration of such of the cities in Peloponnese as should be chosen by
mutual agreement, and that the colony should remain with the city to whom the
arbitrators might assign it. They were also willing to refer the matter to the
oracle at Delphi. If, in defiance of their protestations, war was appealed to,
they should be themselves compelled by this violence to seek friends in
quarters where they had no desire to seek them, and to make even old ties give
way to the necessity of assistance. The answer they got from Corinth was that,
if they would withdraw their fleet and the barbarians from Epidamnus,
negotiation might be possible; but, while the town was still being besieged,
going before arbitrators was out of the question. The Corcyraeans retorted that
if Corinth would withdraw her troops from Epidamnus they would withdraw theirs,
or they were ready to let both parties remain in statu quo, an armistice being
concluded till judgment could be given.
Turning
a deaf ear to all these proposals, when their ships were manned and their
allies had come in, the Corinthians sent a herald before them to declare war
and, getting under way with seventy-five ships and two thousand heavy infantry,
sailed for Epidamnus to give battle to the Corcyraeans. The fleet was under the
command of Aristeus, son of Pellichas, Callicrates, son of Callias, and
Timanor, son of Timanthes; the troops under that of Archetimus, son of
Eurytimus, and Isarchidas, son of Isarchus. When they had reached Actium in the
territory of Anactorium, at the mouth of the mouth of the Gulf of Ambracia,
where the temple of Apollo stands, the Corcyraeans sent on a herald in a light
boat to warn them not to sail against them. Meanwhile they proceeded to man
their ships, all of which had been equipped for action, the old vessels being
undergirded to make them seaworthy. On the return of the herald without any
peaceful answer from the Corinthians, their ships being now manned, they put
out to sea to meet the enemy with a fleet of eighty sail (forty were engaged in
the siege of Epidamnus), formed line, and went into action, and gained a
decisive victory, and destroyed fifteen of the Corinthian vessels. The same day
had seen Epidamnus compelled by its besiegers to capitulate; the conditions
being that the foreigners should be sold, and the Corinthians kept as prisoners
of war, till their fate should be otherwise decided.
After
the engagement the Corcyraeans set up a trophy on Leukimme, a headland of
Corcyra, and slew all their captives except the Corinthians, whom they kept as
prisoners of war. Defeated at sea, the Corinthians and their allies repaired
home, and left the Corcyraeans masters of all the sea about those parts.
Sailing to Leucas, a Corinthian colony, they ravaged their territory, and burnt
Cyllene, the harbour of the Eleans, because they had furnished ships and money
to Corinth. For almost the whole of the period that followed the battle they
remained masters of the sea, and the allies of Corinth were harassed by
Corcyraean cruisers. At last Corinth, roused by the sufferings of her allies,
sent out ships and troops in the fall of the summer, who formed an encampment
at Actium and about Chimerium, in Thesprotis, for the protection of Leucas and
the rest of the friendly cities. The Corcyraeans on their part formed a similar
station on Leukimme. Neither party made any movement, but they remained
confronting each other till the end of the summer, and winter was at hand
before either of them returned home.
Corinth,
exasperated by the war with the Corcyraeans, spent the whole of the year after
the engagement and that succeeding it in building ships, and in straining every
nerve to form an efficient fleet; rowers being drawn from Peloponnese and the
rest of Hellas by the inducement of large bounties. The Corcyraeans, alarmed at
the news of their preparations, being without a single ally in Hellas (for they
had not enrolled themselves either in the Athenian or in the Lacedaemonian
confederacy), decided to repair to Athens in order to enter into alliance and
to endeavour to procure support from her. Corinth also, hearing of their
intentions, sent an embassy to Athens to prevent the Corcyraean navy being
joined by the Athenian, and her prospect of ordering the war according to her
wishes being thus impeded. An assembly was convoked, and the rival advocates
appeared: the Corcyraeans spoke as follows:
"Athenians!
when a people that have not rendered any important service or support to their
neighbours in times past, for which they might claim to be repaid, appear
before them as we now appear before you to solicit their assistance, they may
fairly be required to satisfy certain preliminary conditions. They should show,
first, that it is expedient or at least safe to grant their request; next, that
they will retain a lasting sense of the kindness. But if they cannot clearly
establish any of these points, they must not be annoyed if they meet with a
rebuff. Now the Corcyraeans believe that with their petition for assistance
they can also give you a satisfactory answer on these points, and they have
therefore dispatched us hither. It has so happened that our policy as regards
you with respect to this request, turns out to be inconsistent, and as regards
our interests, to be at the present crisis inexpedient. We say inconsistent,
because a power which has never in the whole of her past history been willing
to ally herself with any of her neighbours, is now found asking them to ally
themselves with her. And we say inexpedient, because in our present war with
Corinth it has left us in a position of entire isolation, and what once seemed
the wise precaution of refusing to involve ourselves in alliances with other
powers, lest we should also involve ourselves in risks of their choosing, has
now proved to be folly and weakness. It is true that in the late naval
engagement we drove back the Corinthians from our shores single-handed. But
they have now got together a still larger armament from Peloponnese and the
rest of Hellas; and we, seeing our utter inability to cope with them without
foreign aid, and the magnitude of the danger which subjection to them implies,
find it necessary to ask help from you and from every other power. And we hope
to be excused if we forswear our old principle of complete political isolation,
a principle which was not adopted with any sinister intention, but was rather
the consequence of an error in judgment.
"Now
there are many reasons why in the event of your compliance you will
congratulate yourselves on this request having been made to you. First, because
your assistance will be rendered to a power which, herself inoffensive, is a
victim to the injustice of others. Secondly, because all that we most value is
at stake in the present contest, and your welcome of us under these
circumstances will be a proof of goodwill which will ever keep alive the
gratitude you will lay up in our hearts. Thirdly, yourselves excepted, we are
the greatest naval power in Hellas. Moreover, can you conceive a stroke of good
fortune more rare in itself, or more disheartening to your enemies, than that
the power whose adhesion you would have valued above much material and moral
strength should present herself self-invited, should deliver herself into your
hands without danger and without expense, and should lastly put you in the way
of gaining a high character in the eyes of the world, the gratitude of those
whom you shall assist, and a great accession of strength for yourselves? You
may search all history without finding many instances of a people gaining all
these advantages at once, or many instances of a power that comes in quest of
assistance being in a position to give to the people whose alliance she
solicits as much safety and honour as she will receive. But it will be urged
that it is only in the case of a war that we shall be found useful. To this we
answer that if any of you imagine that that war is far off, he is grievously
mistaken, and is blind to the fact that Lacedaemon regards you with jealousy
and desires war, and that Corinth is powerful there- the same, remember, that
is your enemy, and is even now trying to subdue us as a preliminary to
attacking you. And this she does to prevent our becoming united by a common
enmity, and her having us both on her hands, and also to ensure getting the
start of you in one of two ways, either by crippling our power or by making its
strength her own. Now it is our policy to be beforehand with her- that is, for
Corcyra to make an offer of alliance and for you to accept it; in fact, we
ought to form plans against her instead of waiting to defeat the plans she
forms against us.
"If
she asserts that for you to receive a colony of hers into alliance is not
right, let her know that every colony that is well treated honours its parent
state, but becomes estranged from it by injustice. For colonists are not sent
forth on the understanding that they are to be the slaves of those that remain
behind, but that they are to be their equals. And that Corinth was injuring us
is clear. Invited to refer the dispute about Epidamnus to arbitration, they
chose to prosecute their complaints war rather than by a fair trial. And let
their conduct towards us who are their kindred be a warning to you not to be
misled by their deceit, nor to yield to their direct requests; concessions to
adversaries only end in self-reproach, and the more strictly they are avoided
the greater will be the chance of security.
"If
it be urged that your reception of us will be a breach of the treaty existing
between you and Lacedaemon, the answer is that we are a neutral state, and that
one of the express provisions of that treaty is that it shall be competent for
any Hellenic state that is neutral to join whichever side it pleases. And it is
intolerable for Corinth to be allowed to obtain men for her navy not only from
her allies, but also from the rest of Hellas, no small number being furnished
by your own subjects; while we are to be excluded both from the alliance left
open to us by treaty, and from any assistance that we might get from other quarters,
and you are to be accused of political immorality if you comply with our
request. On the other hand, we shall have much greater cause to complain of
you, if you do not comply with it; if we, who are in peril and are no enemies
of yours, meet with a repulse at your hands, while Corinth, who is the
aggressor and your enemy, not only meets with no hindrance from you, but is
even allowed to draw material for war from your dependencies. This ought not to
be, but you should either forbid her enlisting men in your dominions, or you
should lend us too what help you may think advisable.
"But
your real policy is to afford us avowed countenance and support. The advantages
of this course, as we premised in the beginning of our speech, are many. We
mention one that is perhaps the chief. Could there be a clearer guarantee of
our good faith than is offered by the fact that the power which is at enmity
with you is also at enmity with us, and that that power is fully able to punish
defection? And there is a wide difference between declining the alliance of an
inland and of a maritime power. For your first endeavour should be to prevent,
if possible, the existence of any naval power except your own; failing this, to
secure the friendship of the strongest that does exist. And if any of you
believe that what we urge is expedient, but fear to act upon this belief, lest
it should lead to a breach of the treaty, you must remember that on the one
hand, whatever your fears, your strength will be formidable to your antagonists;
on the other, whatever the confidence you derive from refusing to receive us,
your weakness will have no terrors for a strong enemy. You must also remember
that your decision is for Athens no less than Corcyra, and that you are not
making the best provision for her interests, if at a time when you are
anxiously scanning the horizon that you may be in readiness for the breaking
out of the war which is all but upon you, you hesitate to attach to your side a
place whose adhesion or estrangement is alike pregnant with the most vital
consequences. For it lies conveniently for the coast- navigation in the
direction of Italy and Sicily, being able to bar the passage of naval
reinforcements from thence to Peloponnese, and from Peloponnese thither; and it
is in other respects a most desirable station. To sum up as shortly as
possible, embracing both general and particular considerations, let this show
you the folly of sacrificing us. Remember that there are but three considerable
naval powers in Hellas- Athens, Corcyra, and Corinth- and that if you allow two
of these three to become one, and Corinth to secure us for herself, you will
have to hold the sea against the united fleets of Corcyra and Peloponnese. But
if you receive us, you will have our ships to reinforce you in the
struggle."
Such
were the words of the Corcyraeans. After they had finished, the Corinthians
spoke as follows:
"These
Corcyraeans in the speech we have just heard do not confine themselves to the
question of their reception into your alliance. They also talk of our being
guilty of injustice, and their being the victims of an unjustifiable war. It
becomes necessary for us to touch upon both these points before we proceed to
the rest of what we have to say, that you may have a more correct idea of the
grounds of our claim, and have good cause to reject their petition. According
to them, their old policy of refusing all offers of alliance was a policy of
moderation. It was in fact adopted for bad ends, not for good; indeed their
conduct is such as to make them by no means desirous of having allies present
to witness it, or of having the shame of asking their concurrence. Besides,
their geographical situation makes them independent of others, and consequently
the decision in cases where they injure any lies not with judges appointed by
mutual agreement, but with themselves, because, while they seldom make voyages
to their neighbours, they are constantly being visited by foreign vessels which
are compelled to put in to Corcyra. In short, the object that they propose to
themselves, in their specious policy of complete isolation, is not to avoid
sharing in the crimes of others, but to secure monopoly of crime to themselves-
the licence of outrage wherever they can compel, of fraud wherever they can
elude, and the enjoyment of their gains without shame. And yet if they were the
honest men they pretend to be, the less hold that others had upon them, the
stronger would be the light in which they might have put their honesty by
giving and taking what was just.
"But
such has not been their conduct either towards others or towards us. The
attitude of our colony towards us has always been one of estrangement and is
now one of hostility; for, say they: 'We were not sent out to be ill-treated.'
We rejoin that we did not found the colony to be insulted by them, but to be
their head and to be regarded with a proper respect. At any rate our other
colonies honour us, and we are much beloved by our colonists; and clearly, if
the majority are satisfied with us, these can have no good reason for a
dissatisfaction in which they stand alone, and we are not acting improperly in
making war against them, nor are we making war against them without having
received signal provocation. Besides, if we were in the wrong, it would be honourable
in them to give way to our wishes, and disgraceful for us to trample on their
moderation; but in the pride and licence of wealth they have sinned again and
again against us, and never more deeply than when Epidamnus, our dependency,
which they took no steps to claim in its distress upon our coming to relieve
it, was by them seized, and is now held by force of arms.
"As
to their allegation that they wished the question to be first submitted to
arbitration, it is obvious that a challenge coming from the party who is safe
in a commanding position cannot gain the credit due only to him who, before
appealing to arms, in deeds as well as words, places himself on a level with
his adversary. In their case, it was not before they laid siege to the place,
but after they at length understood that we should not tamely suffer it, that
they thought of the specious word arbitration. And not satisfied with their own
misconduct there, they appear here now requiring you to join with them not in
alliance but in crime, and to receive them in spite of their being at enmity
with us. But it was when they stood firmest that they should have made
overtures to you, and not at a time when we have been wronged and they are in
peril; nor yet at a time when you will be admitting to a share in your
protection those who never admitted you to a share in their power, and will be
incurring an equal amount of blame from us with those in whose offences you had
no hand. No, they should have shared their power with you before they asked you
to share your fortunes with them.
"So
then the reality of the grievances we come to complain of, and the violence and
rapacity of our opponents, have both been proved. But that you cannot equitably
receive them, this you have still to learn. It may be true that one of the
provisions of the treaty is that it shall be competent for any state, whose
name was not down on the list, to join whichever side it pleases. But this
agreement is not meant for those whose object in joining is the injury of other
powers, but for those whose need of support does not arise from the fact of
defection, and whose adhesion will not bring to the power that is mad enough to
receive them war instead of peace; which will be the case with you, if you
refuse to listen to us. For you cannot become their auxiliary and remain our
friend; if you join in their attack, you must share the punishment which the
defenders inflict on them. And yet you have the best possible right to be
neutral, or, failing this, you should on the contrary join us against them.
Corinth is at least in treaty with you; with Corcyra you were never even in
truce. But do not lay down the principle that defection is to be patronized.
Did we on the defection of the Samians record our vote against you, when the
rest of the Peloponnesian powers were equally divided on the question whether
they should assist them? No, we told them to their face that every power has a
right to punish its own allies. Why, if you make it your policy to receive and
assist all offenders, you will find that just as many of your dependencies will
come over to us, and the principle that you establish will press less heavily
on us than on yourselves.
"This
then is what Hellenic law entitles us to demand as a right. But we have also
advice to offer and claims on your gratitude, which, since there is no danger
of our injuring you, as we are not enemies, and since our friendship does not
amount to very frequent intercourse, we say ought to be liquidated at the
present juncture. When you were in want of ships of war for the war against the
Aeginetans, before the Persian invasion, Corinth supplied you with twenty
vessels. That good turn, and the line we took on the Samian question, when we
were the cause of the Peloponnesians refusing to assist them, enabled you to
conquer Aegina and to punish Samos. And we acted thus at crises when, if ever,
men are wont in their efforts against their enemies to forget everything for
the sake of victory, regarding him who assists them then as a friend, even if
thus far he has been a foe, and him who opposes them then as a foe, even if he
has thus far been a friend; indeed they allow their real interests to suffer
from their absorbing preoccupation in the struggle.
"Weigh
well these considerations, and let your youth learn what they are from their
elders, and let them determine to do unto us as we have done unto you. And let
them not acknowledge the justice of what we say, but dispute its wisdom in the
contingency of war. Not only is the straightest path generally speaking the wisest;
but the coming of the war, which the Corcyraeans have used as a bugbear to
persuade you to do wrong, is still uncertain, and it is not worth while to be
carried away by it into gaining the instant and declared enmity of Corinth. It
were, rather, wise to try and counteract the unfavourable impression which your
conduct to Megara has created. For kindness opportunely shown has a greater
power of removing old grievances than the facts of the case may warrant. And do
not be seduced by the prospect of a great naval alliance. Abstinence from all
injustice to other first-rate powers is a greater tower of strength than
anything that can be gained by the sacrifice of permanent tranquillity for an
apparent temporary advantage. It is now our turn to benefit by the principle
that we laid down at Lacedaemon, that every power has a right to punish her own
allies. We now claim to receive the same from you, and protest against your
rewarding us for benefiting you by our vote by injuring us by yours. On the
contrary, return us like for like, remembering that this is that very crisis in
which he who lends aid is most a friend, and he who opposes is most a foe. And
for these Corcyraeans- neither receive them into alliance in our despite, nor
be their abettors in crime. So do, and you will act as we have a right to
expect of you, and at the same time best consult your own interests."
Such
were the words of the Corinthians.
When
the Athenians had heard both out, two assemblies were held. In the first there
was a manifest disposition to listen to the representations of Corinth; in the
second, public feeling had changed and an alliance with Corcyra was decided on,
with certain reservations. It was to be a defensive, not an offensive alliance.
It did not involve a breach of the treaty with Peloponnese: Athens could not be
required to join Corcyra in any attack upon Corinth. But each of the
contracting parties had a right to the other's assistance against invasion,
whether of his own territory or that of an ally. For it began now to be felt
that the coming of the Peloponnesian war was only a question of time, and no
one was willing to see a naval power of such magnitude as Corcyra sacrificed to
Corinth; though if they could let them weaken each other by mutual conflict, it
would be no bad preparation for the struggle which Athens might one day have to
wage with Corinth and the other naval powers. At the same time the island
seemed to lie conveniently on the coasting passage to Italy and Sicily. With
these views, Athens received Corcyra into alliance and, on the departure of the
Corinthians not long afterwards, sent ten ships to their assistance. They were
commanded by Lacedaemonius, the son of Cimon, Diotimus, the son of Strombichus,
and Proteas, the son of Epicles. Their instructions were to avoid collision
with the Corinthian fleet except under certain circumstances. If it sailed to
Corcyra and threatened a landing on her coast, or in any of her possessions,
they were to do their utmost to prevent it. These instructions were prompted by
an anxiety to avoid a breach of the treaty.
Meanwhile
the Corinthians completed their preparations, and sailed for Corcyra with a
hundred and fifty ships. Of these Elis furnished ten, Megara twelve, Leucas
ten, Ambracia twenty-seven, Anactorium one, and Corinth herself ninety. Each of
these contingents had its own admiral, the Corinthian being under the command
of Xenoclides, son of Euthycles, with four colleagues. Sailing from Leucas,
they made land at the part of the continent opposite Corcyra. They anchored in
the harbour of Chimerium, in the territory of Thesprotis, above which, at some
distance from the sea, lies the city of Ephyre, in the Elean district. By this
city the Acherusian lake pours its waters into the sea. It gets its name from
the river Acheron, which flows through Thesprotis and falls into the lake.
There also the river Thyamis flows, forming the boundary between Thesprotis and
Kestrine; and between these rivers rises the point of Chimerium. In this part
of the continent the Corinthians now came to anchor, and formed an encampment.
When the Corcyraeans saw them coming, they manned a hundred and ten ships,
commanded by Meikiades, Aisimides, and Eurybatus, and stationed themselves at
one of the Sybota isles; the ten Athenian ships being present. On Point
Leukimme they posted their land forces, and a thousand heavy infantry who had
come from Zacynthus to their assistance. Nor were the Corinthians on the
mainland without their allies. The barbarians flocked in large numbers to their
assistance, the inhabitants of this part of the continent being old allies of
theirs.
When
the Corinthian preparations were completed, they took three days' provisions
and put out from Chimerium by night, ready for action. Sailing with the dawn,
they sighted the Corcyraean fleet out at sea and coming towards them. When they
perceived each other, both sides formed in order of battle. On the Corcyraean
right wing lay the Athenian ships, the rest of the line being occupied by their
own vessels formed in three squadrons, each of which was commanded by one of
the three admirals. Such was the Corcyraean formation. The Corinthian was as
follows: on the right wing lay the Megarian and Ambraciot ships, in the centre
the rest of the allies in order. But the left was composed of the best sailers
in the Corinthian navy, to encounter the Athenians and the right wing of the
Corcyraeans. As soon as the signals were raised on either side, they joined
battle. Both sides had a large number of heavy infantry on their decks, and a
large number of archers and darters, the old imperfect armament still
prevailing. The sea-fight was an obstinate one, though not remarkable for its
science; indeed it was more like a battle by land. Whenever they charged each
other, the multitude and crush of the vessels made it by no means easy to get
loose; besides, their hopes of victory lay principally in the heavy infantry on
the decks, who stood and fought in order, the ships remaining stationary. The
manoeuvre of breaking the line was not tried; in short, strength and pluck had
more share in the fight than science. Everywhere tumult reigned, the battle
being one scene of confusion; meanwhile the Athenian ships, by coming up to the
Corcyraeans whenever they were pressed, served to alarm the enemy, though their
commanders could not join in the battle from fear of their instructions. The
right wing of the Corinthians suffered most. The Corcyraeans routed it, and
chased them in disorder to the continent with twenty ships, sailed up to their
camp, and burnt the tents which they found empty, and plundered the stuff. So
in this quarter the Corinthians and their allies were defeated, and the
Corcyraeans were victorious. But where the Corinthians themselves were, on the
left, they gained a decided success; the scanty forces of the Corcyraeans being
further weakened by the want of the twenty ships absent on the pursuit. Seeing
the Corcyraeans hard pressed, the Athenians began at length to assist them more
unequivocally. At first, it is true, they refrained from charging any ships;
but when the rout was becoming patent, and the Corinthians were pressing on,
the time at last came when every one set to, and all distinction was laid
aside, and it came to this point, that the Corinthians and Athenians raised
their hands against each other.
After
the rout, the Corinthians, instead of employing themselves in lashing fast and
hauling after them the hulls of the vessels which they had disabled, turned
their attention to the men, whom they butchered as they sailed through, not
caring so much to make prisoners. Some even of their own friends were slain by
them, by mistake, in their ignorance of the defeat of the right wing For the
number of the ships on both sides, and the distance to which they covered the
sea, made it difficult, after they had once joined, to distinguish between the
conquering and the conquered; this battle proving far greater than any before
it, any at least between Hellenes, for the number of vessels engaged. After the
Corinthians had chased the Corcyraeans to the land, they turned to the wrecks
and their dead, most of whom they succeeded in getting hold of and conveying to
Sybota, the rendezvous of the land forces furnished by their barbarian allies.
Sybota, it must be known, is a desert harbour of Thesprotis. This task over,
they mustered anew, and sailed against the Corcyraeans, who on their part
advanced to meet them with all their ships that were fit for service and
remaining to them, accompanied by the Athenian vessels, fearing that they might
attempt a landing in their territory. It was by this time getting late, and the
paean had been sung for the attack, when the Corinthians suddenly began to back
water. They had observed twenty Athenian ships sailing up, which had been sent
out afterwards to reinforce the ten vessels by the Athenians, who feared, as it
turned out justly, the defeat of the Corcyraeans and the inability of their
handful of ships to protect them. These ships were thus seen by the Corinthians
first. They suspected that they were from Athens, and that those which they saw
were not all, but that there were more behind; they accordingly began to
retire. The Corcyraeans meanwhile had not sighted them, as they were advancing
from a point which they could not so well see, and were wondering why the Corinthians
were backing water, when some caught sight of them, and cried out that there
were ships in sight ahead. Upon this they also retired; for it was now getting
dark, and the retreat of the Corinthians had suspended hostilities. Thus they
parted from each other, and the battle ceased with night. The Corcyraeans were
in their camp at Leukimme, when these twenty ships from Athens, under the
command of Glaucon, the son of Leagrus, and Andocides, son of Leogoras, bore on
through the corpses and the wrecks, and sailed up to the camp, not long after
they were sighted. It was now night, and the Corcyraeans feared that they might
be hostile vessels; but they soon knew them, and the ships came to anchor.
The
next day the thirty Athenian vessels put out to sea, accompanied by all the
Corcyraean ships that were seaworthy, and sailed to the harbour at Sybota,
where the Corinthians lay, to see if they would engage. The Corinthians put out
from the land and formed a line in the open sea, but beyond this made no further
movement, having no intention of assuming the offensive. For they saw
reinforcements arrived fresh from Athens, and themselves confronted by numerous
difficulties, such as the necessity of guarding the prisoners whom they had on
board and the want of all means of refitting their ships in a desert place.
What they were thinking more about was how their voyage home was to be
effected; they feared that the Athenians might consider that the treaty was
dissolved by the collision which had occurred, and forbid their departure.
Accordingly
they resolved to put some men on board a boat, and send them without a herald's
wand to the Athenians, as an experiment. Having done so, they spoke as follows:
"You do wrong, Athenians, to begin war and break the treaty. Engaged in
chastising our enemies, we find you placing yourselves in our path in arms
against us. Now if your intentions are to prevent us sailing to Corcyra, or
anywhere else that we may wish, and if you are for breaking the treaty, first
take us that are here and treat us as enemies." Such was what they said,
and all the Corcyraean armament that were within hearing immediately called out
to take them and kill them. But the Athenians answered as follows:
"Neither are we beginning war, Peloponnesians, nor are we breaking the
treaty; but these Corcyraeans are our allies, and we are come to help them. So
if you want to sail anywhere else, we place no obstacle in your way; but if you
are going to sail against Corcyra, or any of her possessions, we shall do our
best to stop you."
Receiving
this answer from the Athenians, the Corinthians commenced preparations for
their voyage home, and set up a trophy in Sybota, on the continent; while the
Corcyraeans took up the wrecks and dead that had been carried out to them by
the current, and by a wind which rose in the night and scattered them in all
directions, and set up their trophy in Sybota, on the island, as victors. The
reasons each side had for claiming the victory were these. The Corinthians had
been victorious in the sea-fight until night; and having thus been enabled to
carry off most wrecks and dead, they were in possession of no fewer than a
thousand prisoners of war, and had sunk close upon seventy vessels. The
Corcyraeans had destroyed about thirty ships, and after the arrival of the
Athenians had taken up the wrecks and dead on their side; they had besides seen
the Corinthians retire before them, backing water on sight of the Athenian
vessels, and upon the arrival of the Athenians refuse to sail out against them
from Sybota. Thus both sides claimed the victory.
The
Corinthians on the voyage home took Anactorium, which stands at the mouth of
the Ambracian gulf. The place was taken by treachery, being common ground to
the Corcyraeans and Corinthians. After establishing Corinthian settlers there,
they retired home. Eight hundred of the Corcyraeans were slaves; these they
sold; two hundred and fifty they retained in captivity, and treated with great
attention, in the hope that they might bring over their country to Corinth on
their return; most of them being, as it happened, men of very high position in
Corcyra. In this way Corcyra maintained her political existence in the war with
Corinth, and the Athenian vessels left the island. This was the first cause of
the war that Corinth had against the Athenians, viz., that they had fought
against them with the Corcyraeans in time of treaty.
Almost immediately after this, fresh differences arose between the Athenians and Peloponnesians, and contributed their share to the war. Corinth was forming schemes for retaliation, and Athens suspected her hostility. The Potidaeans, who inhabit the isthmus of Pallene, being a Corinthian colony, but tributary allies of Athens, were ordered to raze the wall looking towards Pallene, to give hostages, to dismiss the Corinthian magistrates, and in future not to receive the persons sent from Corinth annually to succeed them. It was feared that they might be persuaded by Perdiccas and the Corinthians to revolt, and might draw the rest of the allies in the direction of Thrace to revolt with them. These precautions against the Potidaeans were taken by the Athenians immediately after the battle at Corcyra. Not only was Corinth at length openly hostile, but Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of the Macedonians, had from an old friend and ally been made an enemy. He had been made an enemy by the Athenians entering into alliance with his brother Philip and Derdas, who were in league against him. In his alarm he had sent to Laceda