Bo WaggonerMaxwell-Dworkin 219 33 Oxford Street Cambridge, MA 02138 I am a Ph.D. candidate at Harvard University in Computer Science (what is Computer Science?). My research interests are mainly in theoretical CS, artificial intelligence, and mechanism design. I am a part of Harvard's EconCS group (what is EconCS?), advised by Yiling Chen. I graduated from Duke University in 2011 studying math and computer science. I'm an avid runner. |

Contents: Research Interests, Teaching, Publications, Talks, Writeups See also: Running page, Misc page |

Mostly in theoretical CS and microeconomics, especially mechanism design (from an algorithmic perspective).

Specific topics: algorithmic auction design, information elicitation (particularly in crowdsourcing settings, from both game-theoretic and machine-learning perspectives), online algorithms (particularly online bipartite matching problems), differential privacy, computational social choice (

Fall 2013: CS 284r, Incentives and Information in Networks. with Professor Yaron Singer.

Teaching Fellow.

Fall 2012: CS 121, Intro to Theory of Computation. with Professor Salil Vadhan.

Teaching Fellow.

Yiling Chen, Kobbi Nissim, and Bo Waggoner.

Designs a mechanism for the following problem: A group of agents (e.g. pirates) each hold private information about the solution to a search problem (e.g. location of buried treasure); we want them to truthfully report to the mechanism, which then assigns search tasks fairly.

Bo Waggoner.

Examines uniformity testing and learning of discrete distributions, given access to independent samples, under ℓp metrics. One result is that a 6-sided die is easier to test for fairness than a 2-sided coin, and a 52-card shuffler easier than the die, if the measure of fairness is ℓp with p > 4/3. In general, gives upper and lower bounds on number of samples needed (tight everywhere for learning and in many cases for uniformity testing).

Also available on arxiv.

Aranyak Mehta, Bo Waggoner, and Morteza Zadimoghaddam.

Designs an algorithm for online bipartite matching when edges are labeled with a probability of success and the goal is to maximize the expected number of matches. Prior work considered the case where all edge probabilities are equal; we consider the general case with unqual (but vanishing) edge probabilities. The approximation ratio is 0.534.

Bo Waggoner and Yiling Chen.

Considers equilibria of "output agreement" games, where two people get the same input and are asked to answer a question about it, rewarded based on how closely their answers agree. Rather than fully truthful, such games elicit "common knowledge" (though some subtleties arise).

Preceded by the following workshop version, containing essentially the same results with different presentation:

Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, and Bo Waggoner.

Designs auctions for maximizing welfare when the bidders, like marketers on a Daily Deals site (e.g. Groupon), have private information about how valuable their deal is to consumers in the form of beliefs or predictions. We elicit this information truthfully, select an outcome, and assign payments to maximize a combination of bidder, auctioneer, and consumer welfare.

Also available on arxiv.

Bo Waggoner, Lirong Xia, and Vincent Conitzer.

Considers voting when voters might cast multiple votes ("false-name manipulation"). We consider how best to design a deterrent against such manipulation in order to maximize the probability that the outcome of the election matches the true population preference, and how to statistically test whether this occurred.

Supplementary: simulation code.

2014-01-10.

Indo-US Lectures Week in Machine Learning, Game Theory, and Optimization, Bangalore.

slides (pdf), slides and notes (pdf).

2013-12-13.

The 9th Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE-13), Cambridge, MA.

slides (Google presentation, with notes), slides (pdf), slides and notes (pdf).

2013-06-16.

The 3rd Workshop on Social Computing and User-Generated Content (SCUGC), at EC-13, Philadelphia, PA.

slides (pdf).

2012-03-26.

Harvard EconCS Group.

slides (pptx), slides (pdf), slides and notes (pdf).

Supplementary: example0.mod, example1.mod.

Supplementary: all example files (zip), example0.l, example0.y, example1.l, example1.y.

Supplementary: all example files (zip), example0.tex, example1.tex, example2.tex, bibexample.tex, bibexample.bib.

Possible misspellings of my name include "Bo Wagner" and "Bo Wagoner".