Recommended Reading.

- Katz-Lindell 3.3, 3.4

1 Definition

**Motivation:** The one-time pad is secure if the two parties use a random key $k$ but the length of the key shared is impractical. Instead, the two parties will share a single short seed $k$ and use it to generate a long key $k'$ that "looks random", i.e. it is pseudorandom.

**What does it mean to “look random”?** The following are some properties we expect a pseudorandom sequence to have:

- Each bit is almost unbiased.
- Fraction of 1’s is $\approx 50\%$.
- Longest run of 1’s is $O(\log n)$.
- Incompressible.
- ...

**Linear congruential generators** Let $s_0$ be the seed. Define $s_{i+1} = as_i + b \pmod{m}$ and output $(s_0, s_1, s_2, \ldots)$ These classical linear congruential generators and variants (e.g. where only parts of the $s_i$’s are output or where $a, b, m$ are part of the seed) have all been “broken”: there exists a sophisticated algorithm which efficiently predicts the next bit of the sequence after seeing a short prefix.

We want a strong enough definition to guarantee that the stream cipher is secure (i.e. has indistinguishable encryptions).

**Definition 1** $G : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ is a pseudorandom generator if

- (efficiency) $G$ can be computed in polynomial time (deterministically).
- (expansion) $|G(x)| = \ell(|x|)$ for some expansion function satisfying $\ell(n) > n$.
- (pseudorandomness) For every non-uniform PPT $D$ (“distinguisher”), there exists a negligible function $\varepsilon(\cdot)$ s.t.

$$|\Pr[D(G(U_n)) = 1] - \Pr[D(U_{\ell(n)}) = 1]| \leq \varepsilon(n) \quad \forall n,$$

where the probabilities are taken over $U_n \overset{R}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^n$, $U_{\ell(n)} \overset{R}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$, and the coin tosses of $D$. 


Input to $G$ is called the seed.

This definition implies that all efficiently testable statistical properties of truly random sequences are satisfied by pseudorandom sequences. For example:

**Proposition 2** If $G$ is a pseudorandom generator, then

$$\Pr\left[\text{fraction of 1’s in } G(U_n) \text{ is } < 1/3\right] \leq \text{neg}(n).$$

More generally, the outcome of any efficient procedure/application that uses pseudo-random bits instead of random ones will not be affected. This is a quite remarkable feature!

2 **PRGS $\implies$ Encryption**

Given a pseudorandom generator $G$, we can obtain an encryption scheme $(G_{\text{Enc}}, E, D)$:

- The key $k$ is the random seed for $G$.
- We generate pseudorandom bits to encrypt like one-time-pad: Let $k' = G(k)$ and define
  $$E_k(m) = k' \oplus m$$

**Theorem 3** If $G$ is a PRG, then $(G_{\text{Enc}}, E, D)$ has indistinguishable encryptions.

**Proof:** Intuition: by pseudorandomness, the above encryption scheme is indistinguishable from using a random one-time pad, which we know to be perfectly secure.

Let $A$ be any PPT algorithm, and let $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{P}$ be any two messages. We want to show that the encryptions of $m_0$ and $m_1$ are computationally indistinguishable. We define four distributions:

- **Real**$_0 \equiv E_K(m_0) = G(K) \oplus m_0$, where $K \leftarrow U_n$.
- **Real**$_1 \equiv E_K(m_1) = G(K) \oplus m_1$, where $K \leftarrow U_n$.
- **Ideal**$_0 \equiv k' \oplus m_0$, where $k' \leftarrow U_{t(n)}$. 
- **Ideal**$_1 \equiv k' \oplus m_1$, where $k' \leftarrow U_{t(n)}$. 

- \( \text{Ideal}_1 \equiv K' \oplus m_1 \), where \( K' \leftarrow U_{l(n)} \).

We want to show that \( \text{Real}_0 \) and \( \text{Real}_1 \) are computationally indistinguishable.

- \( \text{Real}_0 \) and \( \text{Ideal}_0 \) are indistinguishable by the pseudorandomness of \( G \).
- \( \text{Ideal}_0 \) and \( \text{Ideal}_1 \) are identical by the perfect secrecy of the one-time pad.
- \( \text{Real}_1 \) and \( \text{Ideal}_1 \) are also indistinguishable by the pseudorandomness of \( G \).

Thus, \( \text{Real}_0 \) and \( \text{Real}_1 \) are indistinguishable.

3 Next Couple of Lectures

We have just seen how to obtain secure encryption from a pseudorandom generator. Our goal in the next few lectures will be to see how to replace the assumption that there exist pseudorandom generators with a lower-level/more tangible assumption (arguably it will be easier to believe in).

The assumption that we will rely on is the existence of functions that are “easy” to evaluate, but “hard” to invert. Such functions are called one-way functions. (In a previous lecture, we have already seen an example of a conjectured one-way function, namely integer multiplication. We will elaborate more on that example, and more.) Eventually, we will have established the following sequence of implications:

\[
\text{OWF} \implies \text{PRG} \implies \text{ENC}.
\]

The second implication (\( \text{PRG} \implies \text{ENC} \)) is what we have seen today. Establishing the first implication (\( \text{OWF} \implies \text{PRG} \)) is more involved and will require a couple of lectures (actually, we will prove a weaker implication – namely that one-way permutations imply pseudorandom generators).