Budget Feasible Mechanism Design

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Overview: Budget feasible mechanism design captures scenarios where the goal is to buy items or services from strategic agents under budget. The setting poses interesting combinatorial optimization problems with application domains that include crowdsourcing, marketing in social networks, recommendation systems, spectrum auctions, and privacy auctions.

Tutorial: The tutorial focuses on both the theory and the applications. The theoretical developments are concerned with combinatorial optimization, competitive analysis, approximation ratios, Bayesian models, posted price mechanisms, and leave many open questions. The applications discussed are relevant to those interested in influence in social networks, pricing and matching crowdsourcing tasks, and privacy auctions. The tutorial should provide a useful toolbox for procurement-related problems, as well as good exposure to open problems for those interested in combinatorial optimization, mechanism design, and online learning.

Budget Feasible Mechanism Design
By Yaron Singer
In ACM SIGecom Exchanges 12(2), 2013.

Budget Feasible Mechanisms
Presented by Nick Gravin and Yaron Singer
Tutorial at Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) 2013


SEAS