

Using Nondeterminism to Amplify Hardness*

Alexander Healy [†]

Salil Vadhan [‡]

Emanuele Viola [§]

Division of Engineering & Applied Sciences
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

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Abstract

We revisit the problem of hardness amplification in \mathcal{NP} , as recently studied by O’Donnell (STOC ‘02). We prove that if \mathcal{NP} has a balanced function f such that any circuit of size $s(n)$ fails to compute f on a $1/\text{poly}(n)$ fraction of inputs, then \mathcal{NP} has a function f' such that any circuit of size $s'(n) = s(\sqrt{n})^{\Omega(1)}$ fails to compute f' on a $1/2 - 1/s'(n)$ fraction of inputs. In particular,

1. If $s(n) = n^{\omega(1)}$, we amplify to hardness $1/2 - 1/n^{\omega(1)}$.
2. If $s(n) = 2^{n^{\Omega(1)}}$, we amplify to hardness $1/2 - 1/2^{n^{\Omega(1)}}$.
3. If $s(n) = 2^{\Omega(n)}$, we amplify to hardness $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})}$.

These improve the results of O’Donnell, which only amplified to $1/2 - 1/\sqrt{n}$. O’Donnell also proved that no construction of a certain general form could amplify beyond $1/2 - 1/n$. We bypass this barrier by using both *derandomization* and *nondeterminism* in the construction of f' .

We also prove impossibility results demonstrating that both our use of nondeterminism and the hypothesis that f is balanced are necessary for “black-box” hardness amplification procedures (such as ours).

Keywords average-case complexity, hardness amplification, pseudorandom generators for space-bounded computation, noise stability.

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[†]Email: ahealy@fas.harvard.edu. Research supported in part by NSF grant CCR-0205423.

[‡]Email: salil@eecs.harvard.edu. Research supported by NSF grant CCR-0133096, ONR grant N00014-04-1-0478, a Sloan Research Fellowship, and US-Israel BSF grant 2002246. Work done in part while a fellow at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study at Harvard University.

[§]Email: viola@eecs.harvard.edu. Research supported by NSF grant CCR-0133096 and US-Israel BSF grant 2002246.

1 Introduction

Average-case complexity is a fundamental topic in complexity theory, whose study has at least two distinct motivations. On one hand, it may provide more meaningful explanations than worst-case complexity about the intractability of problem instances actually encountered in practice. On the other hand, it provides us with methods to generate hard instances, allowing us to harness intractability for useful ends such as cryptography and derandomization.

One of the goals of this area is to establish connections between average-case complexity and worst-case complexity. While this has been accomplished for high complexity classes such as $\#\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{EXPTIME}$ (e.g. [Lip, BF, BFL, FL, CPS, STV, TV, Vio1]), it remains a major open question for \mathcal{NP} . In fact, there are results showing that such connections for \mathcal{NP} are unlikely to be provable using the same kinds of techniques used for the high complexity classes [FF, Vio1, BT, Vio2].

A more modest goal is “hardness amplification”, where we seek to establish connections between “mild” average-case complexity and “strong” average-case complexity. That is, given a problem for which a nonnegligible fraction of inputs are “hard”, can we obtain a problem for which almost all inputs are hard? To make this precise, let us define “hard”.

Definition 1.1. For $\delta \in [0, 1/2]$, a function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is δ -hard for size s if every circuit of size s fails to compute f on at least an δ fraction of inputs.

Note that the maximum value of the hardness parameter δ is $1/2$ because f is boolean (so can trivially be computed with error probability at most $1/2$.)

The *hardness amplification problem* is to convert a function f that is δ -hard for size s into a function f' that is $(1/2 - \epsilon)$ -hard for size polynomially related to s . Typically, $\delta = 1/\text{poly}(n)$ and the aim is to make $\epsilon = \epsilon(n)$ vanish as quickly as possible.

The standard approach to hardness amplification employs Yao’s XOR Lemma [Yao] (see [GNW]): Given a mildly hard-on-average function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, we define $f' : \{0, 1\}^{n \cdot k} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ by

$$f'(x_1, \dots, x_k) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} f(x_1) \oplus f(x_2) \oplus \dots \oplus f(x_k).$$

The XOR Lemma says that the hardness of f' approaches $1/2$ exponentially fast with k . More precisely:

Yao’s XOR Lemma. If f is δ -hard for size $s(n) \geq n^{\omega(1)}$ and $k \leq \text{poly}(n)$, then f' is $(1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(\delta k)} - 1/s')$ -hard for size $s'(n \cdot k) = s(n)^{\Omega(1)}$.

In particular, taking $k = \Theta(n/\delta)$, the amplified hardness is dominated by the $1/s'$ term. That is, we can amplify to hardness $(1/2 - \epsilon)$, where ϵ is polynomially related to the (reciprocal of the) circuit size for which f was hard. (Note, however, that we should measure $\epsilon = \epsilon(n')$ as a function of the new input length $n' = n \cdot k$, so when $k = n$, the hardness is actually $1/2 - 1/s(\sqrt{n'})^{\Omega(1)}$.)

However, if we are interested in hardness amplification within \mathcal{NP} (i.e. f and f' are characteristic functions of languages in \mathcal{NP}), we cannot use the XOR lemma; it does not ensure that f' is in \mathcal{NP} when f is in \mathcal{NP} . Hardness amplification within \mathcal{NP} was first addressed in a recent paper of O’Donnell [O’D], which is the starting point for our work.

1.1 O’Donnell’s Hardness Amplification

To ensure that the new function f' is in \mathcal{NP} when f is in \mathcal{NP} , O’Donnell [O’D] was led to study constructions of the form

$$f'(x_1, \dots, x_k) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} C(f(x_1), f(x_2), \dots, f(x_k)), \quad (1)$$

where C is an efficiently computable *monotone* function. The monotonicity of C ensures that f' is in \mathcal{NP} when f is in \mathcal{NP} . But we are left with the task of choosing such a function C and proving that it indeed amplifies hardness.

Remarkably, O’Donnell was able to precisely characterize the amplification properties of Construction 1 in terms of a combinatorial property of the combining function C , called its *expected bias*. (The actual definition is not needed for this discussion, but can be found in Section 3.) By finding a monotone combining function in which this expected bias is small, he obtained the first positive result on hardness amplification in \mathcal{NP} :

O’Donnell’s Theorem [O’D]. *If \mathcal{NP} has a balanced function that is $1/\text{poly}(n)$ -hard for polynomial-size circuits, then \mathcal{NP} has a function that is $(1/2 - 1/n^{1/2-\alpha})$ -hard for polynomial-size circuits (where α is an arbitrarily small positive constant).*

However, the amplification provided by O’Donnell’s theorem is not as strong as what the XOR Lemma gives. It is limited to $1/2 - 1/\sqrt{n}$, regardless of the circuit size s for which the original function is hard, even if s is exponentially large. The XOR Lemma, on the other hand, amplifies to $1/2 - 1/s^{\Omega(1)}$. O’Donnell showed that this difference is inherent — no construction of the form (1) with a monotone combining function C can always amplify hardness to better than $1/2 - 1/n$.¹

1.2 Our Result

In this paper, we manage to amplify hardness within \mathcal{NP} beyond the $1/2 - 1/n$ barrier:

Main Theorem. *If \mathcal{NP} has a balanced function that is $1/\text{poly}(n)$ -hard for circuits of size $s(n)$, then \mathcal{NP} has a function that is $(1/2 - 1/s'(n))$ -hard for circuits of size $s'(n) = s(\sqrt{n})^{\Omega(1)}$. In particular,*

1. *If $s(n) = n^{\omega(1)}$, we amplify to hardness $1/2 - 1/n^{\omega(1)}$.*
2. *If $s(n) = 2^{n^{\Omega(1)}}$, we amplify to hardness $1/2 - 1/2^{n^{\Omega(1)}}$.*
3. *If $s(n) = 2^{\Omega(n)}$, we amplify to hardness $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})}$.*

Items 1–3 match the parameters of the Yao’s XOR Lemma. However, subsequent “derandomizations” of the XOR Lemma [Imp, IW1] actually amplify up to $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(n)}$ rather than just $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})}$ in the case $s(n) = 2^{\Omega(n)}$. This gap is *not* inherent in our approach and, as mentioned below, would be eliminated given a corresponding improvement in one of the tools we employ.

Of course, our construction cannot be of the form in Construction (1). Below we describe our two main points of departure.

¹The gap between O’Donnell’s positive result of $1/2 - 1/\sqrt{n}$ and his negative result of $1/2 - 1/n$ is not significant for what follows, and in particular, it will be subsumed by our improvements.

1.3 Techniques

To explain how we bypass it, we first look more closely at the source of the $1/2 - 1/n$ barrier. The actual barrier is $1/2 - 1/k$, where k is the input length of the monotone combining function C . (This is based on the [KKL] bound on the noise stability of monotone functions.) Since in Construction (1), f' has input length $n' = n \cdot k \geq k$, it follows that we cannot amplify beyond $1/2 - 1/n'$.

Derandomization. Given the above, our first idea is to break the link between the input length of f' and the input length of the combining function C . We do this by *derandomizing* O'Donnell's construction. That is, the inputs x_1, \dots, x_k are no longer taken independently (as in Construction (1)), but are generated pseudorandomly from a short seed of length $n' \ll k$, which becomes the actual input to f' . Our method for generating the x_i 's is based on combinatorial designs (as in the Nisan–Wigderson generator [NW]) and Nisan's pseudorandom generator for space-bounded computation [Nis2], and reduces the input length of f' from $n \cdot k$ to $n' = O(n^2 + \log^2 k)$. We stress that this derandomization is unconditional, i.e. requires no additional complexity assumption. We also remark that it is the quadratic seed length of Nisan's generator that limits our amplification to $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})}$ rather than $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(n)}$ in Part 3 of our Main Theorem, and thus any improvement in Nisan's generator would yield a corresponding improvement in our result.

Similar derandomizations have previously been achieved for Yao's XOR Lemma by Impagliazzo [Imp] and Impagliazzo and Wigderson [IW1]. The analysis of such derandomizations is typically tailored to a particular proof, and indeed both [Imp, IW1] gave new proofs of the XOR Lemma for that purpose. In our case, we do not know how to derandomize O'Donnell's original proof, but instead manage to derandomize a different proof due to Trevisan [Tre].

Our derandomization allows for k to be larger than the input length of f' , and hence we can go beyond the $1/2 - 1/n'$ barrier. Indeed, by taking k to be a sufficiently large polynomial, we amplify to $1/2 - 1/(n')^c$ for any constant c .

Using Nondeterminism. To amplify further, it is tempting to take k superpolynomial in the input length of f' . But then we run into a different problem: how do we ensure that f' is in \mathcal{NP} ? The natural algorithm for f' requires running the algorithm for f on k inputs.

To overcome this difficulty, we observe that we need only give an efficient *nondeterministic* algorithm for f' . Each nondeterministic path may involve only polynomially many evaluations of f while the global outcome $f'(x)$ depends on exponentially many evaluations. To implement this idea, we exploit the specific structure of the combining function C . Namely, we (like O'Donnell) use the TRIBES function of Ben-Or and Linial [BL], which is a monotone DNF with clauses of size $O(\log k)$. Thus, the nondeterministic algorithm for f' can simply guess a satisfied clause and evaluate f on the $O(\log k)$ corresponding inputs.

1.4 Other Results

We also present some complementary negative results:

- We show that the assumption that the original hard function is balanced is necessary, in the sense that no monotone “black-box” hardness amplification can amplify unbalanced functions of unknown bias (or even improve their bias).

- We show that our use of nondeterminism is necessary, in the sense that any “black-box” hardness amplification in which each evaluation of f' is a monotone function of at most k evaluations of f can amplify hardness to at most $1/2 - 1/k$.

Informally, a “black-box” hardness amplification in which the construction of the amplified function f' from f only utilizes f as an oracle and is well-defined for any function f (regardless of whether or not it is in \mathcal{NP}). Moreover, the correctness of the construction is proved by a generic reduction that converts *oracle* A (regardless of its circuit size) computes f' well on average into one that computes f well on average. (A formal definition is given in Section 11.) We note that most results on hardness amplification against circuits, including ours, are black-box (though there have been some recent results using non-black-box techniques in hardness amplification against *uniform* algorithms; see [IW2, TV]).

Our framework also gives a new proof of the hardness amplification by Impagliazzo and Wigderson [IW1]. Our proof is simpler and in particular its analysis does not employ the Goldreich–Levin [GL] step.

1.5 Organization

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss some preliminaries. In Section 3, we review existing results on hardness amplification in \mathcal{NP} . In Section 4, we present our main results and new techniques. Sections 5 through 9 treat the details of the proof of our main theorem. In Section 10, we show how we could amplify to $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(n)}$ given an improvement in the pseudorandom generator we use. Hardness amplification of unbalanced functions is discussed in Section 11, and finally in Section 12 we show a sense in which the use of nondeterminism in our main result is necessary.

2 Preliminaries

We denote the uniform distribution on $\{0, 1\}^n$ by U_n . If U_n occurs more than once in the same expression, it is understood that these all represent the same random variable; for example, $U_n \cdot f(U_n)$ denotes the random variable obtained by choosing $X \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^n$ and outputting $X \cdot f(X)$.

Definition 2.1. *Let X and Y be two random variables taking values over the same set S . Then the statistical difference between X and Y , is*

$$\Delta(X, Y) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \max_{T \subseteq S} \left| \Pr[X \in T] - \Pr[Y \in T] \right|.$$

We view probabilistic functions as functions of two inputs, e.g. $h(x; r)$, the first being the input to the function and the second being the randomness. (Deterministic functions may be thought of as probabilistic functions that ignore the randomness.) For notational convenience, we will often omit the second input to a probabilistic function, e.g. writing $h(x)$ instead of $h(x; r)$, in which case we view $h(x)$ as the random variable $h(x; U_{|r|})$.

Definition 2.2. *The bias of a 0-1 random variable X is*

$$\text{Bias}[X] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left| \Pr[X = 0] - \Pr[X = 1] \right| = 2 \cdot \Delta(X, U_1).$$

Analogously, the bias of a probabilistic function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is

$$\text{Bias}[f] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left| \Pr[f(U_n) = 0] - \Pr[f(U_n) = 1] \right|,$$

where the probabilities are taken over both the input chosen according to U_n and the coin tosses of f . We say that f is balanced when $\text{Bias}[f] = 0$.

We say that the random variables X and Y are ϵ -indistinguishable for size s if for every circuit C of size s ,

$$\left| \Pr_X[C(X) = 1] - \Pr_Y[C(Y) = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon.$$

We will routinely use the following connection between hardness and indistinguishability.

Lemma 2.3 ([Yao]). *Let $h : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be any probabilistic function. Then the distributions $U_n \cdot h(U_n)$ and $U_n \cdot U_1$ are ϵ -indistinguishable for size s if, and only if, h is $(1/2 - \epsilon/2)$ -hard for size $s + \Theta(1)$.*

Finally, whenever we amplify the hardness of a function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is hard for circuits of size $s(n)$, we assume that $s(n)$ is well-behaved in the sense that it is computable in time $\text{poly}(n)$ and $s(cn) = s(n)^{O(1)}$, for all constants $c > 0$. Most natural functions smaller than 2^n , such as $n^k, 2^{\log^k n}, 2^{n^\epsilon}, 2^{\epsilon n}$ are well-behaved in this sense.

3 Overview of Hardness Amplification in \mathcal{NP}

In this section we review the essential components of existing results on hardness amplification in \mathcal{NP} . We then discuss the limitations of these techniques. By the end of this section, we will have sketched the main result of O'Donnell [O'D], following the approach of Trevisan [Tre]. We outline this result in a way that will facilitate the presentation of our results in subsequent sections.

Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be an average-case hard function, and let $C : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be any function. In [O'D], O'Donnell studies the hardness of functions of the form

$$C \circ f^{\otimes k} : (\{0, 1\}^n)^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$$

where $f^{\otimes k}(x_1, \dots, x_k) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (f(x_1), \dots, f(x_k))$, and \circ denotes composition. That is,

$$(C \circ f^{\otimes k})(x_1, \dots, x_k) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} C(f(x_1), \dots, f(x_k)).$$

In order to ensure that $C \circ f^{\otimes k} \in \mathcal{NP}$ whenever $f \in \mathcal{NP}$, O'Donnell chooses C to be a polynomial-time computable *monotone* function. (Indeed, it is not hard to see that a monotone combination of \mathcal{NP} functions is itself in \mathcal{NP} .)

O'Donnell characterizes the hardness of $C \circ f^{\otimes k}$ in terms of a combinatorial property of the combining function C , called its *expected bias* (which we define later).

We will now review the key steps in establishing this characterization and O'Donnell's final amplification theorem.

STEP 1: IMPAGLIAZZO'S HARDCORE SET. An important tool for establishing this connection is the so-called hardcore set lemma of Impagliazzo [Imp], which allows us to pass from computational hardness to information-theoretic hardness.

Definition 3.1. We say that a (probabilistic) function $g : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is δ -random if g is balanced and there exists a subset $H \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$ with $|H| = 2\delta 2^n$ such that $g(x) = U_1$ (i.e. a coin flip) for $x \in H$ and $g(x)$ is deterministic for $x \notin H$.

Thus, a δ -random function has a set of relative size 2δ on which it is information-theoretically unpredictable. The Impagliazzo hardcore set lemma says that any δ -hard function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ has a hardcore set $H \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$ of density $\approx 2\delta$ such that f is very hard-on-average on H . Thus, f looks like a δ -random function to small circuits (cf., Lemma 2.3). (Following subsequent works, our formulation of Impagliazzo's lemma differs from the original one in several respects.)

Lemma 3.2 ([Imp], [KS], [STV], [O'D]). For any function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is balanced and δ -hard for size s , there exists a δ' -random function $g : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $X \cdot f(X)$ and $X \cdot g(X)$ are ϵ -indistinguishable for size $\Omega(s\epsilon^2/\log(1/\delta))$, with $\delta \leq \delta' \leq 2\delta$, where $X \equiv U_n$.

In particular, by a standard hybrid argument,

$$X_1 \cdots X_k \cdot f(X_1) \cdots f(X_k) \text{ and } X_1 \cdots X_k \cdot g(X_1) \cdots g(X_k)$$

are $k\epsilon$ -indistinguishable for size $\Omega(s\epsilon^2/\log(1/\delta))$, where the X_i 's are uniform and independent.

STEP 2: EXPECTED BIAS. By the above, proving the computational hardness of $C \circ f^{\otimes k}$ reduces to calculating the information-theoretic hardness of $C \circ g^{\otimes k}$ for some δ' -random g . It turns out that information-theoretic hardness can be characterized by the following quantity.

Definition 3.3. Let $h : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be any probabilistic function. We define the expected bias of h by

$$\text{ExpBias}[h] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{E}_{x \leftarrow U_n} [\text{Bias}[h(x)]],$$

where $\text{Bias}[h(x)]$ is taken over the coin tosses of h .

The next lemma shows that information-theoretic hardness is equivalent to expected bias.

Lemma 3.4. For any probabilistic $h : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$,

$$\Delta(U_n \cdot h(U_n), U_n \cdot U_1) = \frac{1}{2} \text{ExpBias}[h].$$

Proof. $\Delta(U_n \cdot h(U_n), U_n \cdot U_1) = \mathbb{E}_{x \leftarrow U_n} [\Delta(h(x), U_1)] = \mathbb{E}_{x \leftarrow U_n} [\text{Bias}[h(x)]/2] = \text{ExpBias}[h]/2. \quad \square$

In particular, no circuit (regardless of its size) can distinguish between $U_n \cdot h(U_n)$ and $U_n \cdot U_1$ with advantage greater than $\text{ExpBias}[h]/2$.

Now we characterize the hardness of $C \circ f^{\otimes k}$ in terms of expected bias. Specifically, by taking $\epsilon = 1/s^{1/3}$ in Lemma 3.2 and using Lemmas 2.3 and 3.4, one can show the following.

Lemma 3.5 ([O'D]). *Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be balanced and δ -hard for size s , and let $C : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be any function. Then there exists a δ -random function $g : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $C \circ f^{\otimes k} : (\{0, 1\}^n)^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ has hardness*

$$\frac{1}{2} - \frac{\text{ExpBias}[C \circ g^{\otimes k}]}{2} - \frac{k}{s^{1/3}}$$

for circuits of size $\Omega(s^{1/3}/\log(1/\delta)) - \text{size}(C)$, where $\text{size}(C)$ denotes the size of a smallest circuit computing C .

What makes this lemma so useful is that the quantity $\text{ExpBias}[C \circ g^{\otimes k}]$ turns out to be independent of the choice of the δ -random function g and hence also of the particular hard function f . (Specifically, it equals the expectation of the bias of C after a random restriction that leaves each input bit unrestricted with probability δ .) Thus we are left with the task of understanding a purely combinatorial property of the combining function C .

STEP 3: NOISE STABILITY Unfortunately, it is often difficult to analyze the expected bias directly. Nonetheless, the expected bias is closely related to the *noise stability*, a quantity that is more amenable to analysis and well-studied (e.g., [KKL], [O'D], [MO]).

Definition 3.6. *The noise stability of C with respect to noise δ , denoted $\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C]$, is defined by*

$$\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 2 \cdot \Pr_{x, \eta}[C(x) = C(x \oplus \eta)] - 1,$$

where x is random, η is a vector whose bits are independently one with probability δ and \oplus denotes bitwise XOR.

The following lemma from [O'D] bounds the expected bias of $C \circ g^{\otimes k}$ (and hence the hardness in Lemma 3.5) in terms of the noise stability of C .

Lemma 3.7. *Let $g : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be δ -random. Then*

$$\text{ExpBias}[C \circ g^{\otimes k}] \leq \sqrt{\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C]}.$$

Combining this with Lemma 3.5, we find that the hardness of $C \circ f^{\otimes k}$ is roughly $1/2 - \sqrt{\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C]}/2$. The next step is to exhibit a combining function C with a small noise stability (to ensure that the hardness of $C \circ f^{\otimes k}$ is as close to $1/2$ as possible). The following is shown in [O'D].

Lemma 3.8 ([O'D]). *For all $\delta > 0$, there exists a $k = \text{poly}(1/\delta)$ and a polynomial-time computable monotone function $C : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ with $\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C] \leq 1/k^{\Omega(1)}$.*

Finally, by combining Lemmas 3.5, 3.7 and 3.8, we obtain the following weaker version of O'Donnell's hardness amplification within \mathcal{NP} . (While a stronger version of O'Donnell's result was mentioned in the introduction, the following version will suffice as a starting point for our work.)

Theorem 3.9 ([O'D]). *If there is a balanced $f \in \mathcal{NP}$, $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is $1/\text{poly}(n)$ -hard for size $s(n)$, then there is $f' \in \mathcal{NP}$, $f' : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is $(1/2 - 1/m^{\Omega(1)})$ -hard for size $s(m^{\Omega(1)})^{\Omega(1)}$.*

LIMITATIONS OF DIRECT PRODUCT CONSTRUCTIONS.

O’Donnell also showed that Theorem 3.9 is essentially the best result that one can obtain using the techniques that we have described thus far. He showed that for all monotone combining functions C there is a δ -hard f such that the hardness of $C \circ f^{\otimes k}$ is no better than $1/2 - \text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C]/2$. This is problematic because the noise stability of monotone functions cannot become too small.

Theorem 3.10 ([KKL]). *For every monotone function $C : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ and every $\delta > 0$,*

$$\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C] \geq (1 - 2\delta) \cdot \Omega\left(\frac{\log^2 k}{k}\right).$$

Therefore, for any monotone $C : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ there is a δ -hard f such that $C \circ f^{\otimes k}$ does not have hardness $1/2 - \text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C]/2 \leq 1/2 - \Omega(1/k)$. Since $C \circ f^{\otimes k}$ takes inputs of length $m = n \cdot k \geq k$, this implies that *we must employ a new technique to amplify beyond hardness $1/2 - \Omega(1/m)$.*

4 Our Results

In this paper, we obtain the following improvement upon Theorem 3.9.

Theorem 4.1 (Main Theorem). *If there is a balanced $f \in \mathcal{NP}$, $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is $1/\text{poly}(n)$ -hard for size $s(n)$, then there is $f' \in \mathcal{NP}$, $f' : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is $(1/2 - 1/s(\sqrt{m})^{\Omega(1)})$ -hard for size $s(\sqrt{m})^{\Omega(1)}$.*

We also show that the assumption that we start with a *balanced* function f is essential. Specifically, we show (Section 11) that no monotone black-box hardness amplification can amplify the hardness of functions whose bias is unknown. Most hardness amplifications, including the one in this paper, are black-box. However, the assumption that f is balanced can be dispensed with when amplifying within \mathcal{NP}/poly (i.e., f, f' are computed by nondeterministic polynomial-size circuits).

We now describe the two main techniques that allow us to prove Theorem 4.1. As explained in the introduction, these two techniques are derandomization and nondeterminism.

4.1 Derandomization

As in the previous section, let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be our hard function and let $C : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be a (monotone) combining function.

We will derandomize O’Donnell’s construction using an appropriately “pseudorandom” generator.

Definition 4.2. *A generator $G : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ is any function. We call l the seed length of G , and we often write $G(\sigma) = X_1 \cdots X_k$, with each $X_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$.*

G is explicitly computable if given $\sigma, 1 \leq i \leq k$, we can compute X_i in time $\text{poly}(l, \log k)$, where $G(\sigma) = X_1 \cdots X_k$.

Instead of using the function $C \circ f^{\otimes k} : (\{0, 1\}^n)^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, we take a generator $G : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ (where $l \ll nk$) and use $(C \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, i.e.,

$$(C \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G(\sigma) = C(f(X_1), \dots, f(X_k)),$$

where $(X_1, \dots, X_k) \in (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ is the output of $G(\sigma)$. This reduces the input length of the function to l . Therefore, if $l \ll nk$ we would expect $(C \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G$ to be harder (with respect to its input length) than $C \circ f^{\otimes k}$. We will show that this is indeed the case, provided the generator G satisfies the following requirements:

1. **G is indistinguishability-preserving:** Analogously to Lemma 3.5, the generator G should be such that the computational hardness of $(C \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G$ is at least the information-theoretic hardness of $(C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G$ for some δ -random function g – that is, at least $1/2 - \text{ExpBias}[(C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G]$. We will see that this can be achieved provided that G is *indistinguishability-preserving*; that is (analogously to the last part of Lemma 3.2),

$$\sigma \cdot f(X_1) \cdots f(X_k) \text{ and } \sigma \cdot g(X_1) \cdots g(X_k)$$

should be indistinguishable, for some δ -random g , when $\sigma \xleftarrow{R} \{0, 1\}^l$ and $(X_1, \dots, X_k) \in (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ is the output of G on input σ .

2. **G fools the expected bias:** G should be such that for any δ -random g , $\text{ExpBias}[(C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G]$ is approximately $\text{ExpBias}[C \circ g^{\otimes k}]$, and thus, by Lemma 3.7:

$$\text{ExpBias}[(C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G] \leq \sqrt{\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C] + \epsilon}, \quad (2)$$

for a suitably small ϵ . Actually, we will not show that G fools the expected bias directly and instead will work with a related quantity (the expected collision probability), which will still suffice to show Inequality (2).


Informally, the effect of the two above requirements on the generator G is that the hardness of $(C \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G$ is roughly the hardness of $C \circ f^{\otimes k}$, while dramatically reducing the input length from nk to l (the seed length of G). More precisely, as illustrated in Figure 1, the first requirement allows us to relate the hardness of $(C \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G$ to the information-theoretic hardness of $C \circ g^{\otimes k}$ (where g is a δ -random function); the second allows us to relate this information-theoretic hardness to the noise stability of the combining function C . In particular, if we employ the combining function from Lemma 3.8, we obtain hardness $1/2 - 1/k^{\Omega(1)}$. Thus, by choosing $k \gg l$, we bypass the barrier discussed at the end of the previous section.

Now we briefly describe how the above requirements on G are met. The first requirement is achieved through a generator that outputs *combinatorial designs*. This construction is essentially from Nisan and Wigderson [Nis1, NW] and has been used in many places, e.g. [IW1, STV].

The second requirement is achieved as follows. We show that if G is pseudorandom against space-bounded algorithms and the combining function C is computable in small space (with one-way access to its input), then Inequality (2) holds. We then use Nisan’s *unconditional* pseudorandom generator against space-bounded algorithms [Nis2], and show that combining functions with low noise stability can in fact be computed in small space.² Note that we only use the pseudorandomness of the generator G to relate the expected bias with respect to G to a combinatorial property of the combining function C . In particular, it is *not* used to fool the circuits trying to compute the hard

²The same approach also works using the unconditional pseudorandom generator against constant-depth circuits of [Nis1] and showing that the combining function is computable by a constant-depth circuit; however, the space generator gives us slightly better parameters.

Figure 1: Derandomization overview.



function. This is what allows us to use an unconditional generator against a relatively weak model of computation.

Our final generator, Γ , is the generator obtained by XORing a generator that is indistinguishability-preserving and a generator that fools the expected bias, yielding a generator that has both properties. The approach of XORing two generators in this way appeared in [IW1], and was subsequently used in [STV].

4.2 Using Nondeterminism

The derandomization described above gives hardness amplification up to $1/2 - 1/n^c$ for any constant c . This already improves upon the best previous result, namely Theorem 3.9. However, to go beyond this new techniques are required. The problem is that if we want C to be computable in time $\text{poly}(n)$, we must take $k = \text{poly}(n)$ and thus we amplify to at most $1/2 - 1/k = 1/2 - 1/\text{poly}(n)$.

We solve this problem taking full advantage of the power of \mathcal{NP} , namely nondeterminism. This allows us to use a function $C : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ which is computable in *nondeterministic* time $\text{poly}(n, \log(k))$; thus, the amplified function will still be in \mathcal{NP} for k as large as 2^n .

Conversely, in Section 12 we show that any non-adaptive monotone black-box hardness amplification that amplifies to hardness $1/2 - 1/n^{\omega(1)}$ cannot be computed in \mathcal{P} , i.e. the use of nondeterminism is essential.

We will now proceed by discussing the details of the derandomization (Sections 5, 6 and 7) and the use of nondeterminism (Section 8). The results obtained in these sections are summarized

Table 1: Hardness Amplification within \mathcal{NP} .

Functions : $\{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$		
Amplification up to	Technique	Reference
$1/2 - 1/\sqrt{n}$	Direct Product	[O'D]
$1/2 - 1/n^c$, for every c	Derandomized Direct Product	Theorem 7.1
$1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})}$	Derandomized Direct Product & Nondeterminism	Theorem 8.1

in Table 1. For clarity of exposition, we focus on the case where the original hard function f is balanced and is $1/3$ -hard. Hardness amplification from hardness $1/\text{poly}(n)$ is discussed in Section 9, and hardness amplification of unbalanced functions is discussed in Section 11.

5 Preserving Indistinguishability

The main result in this section is that if G is pseudorandom in an appropriate sense, then the hardness of $(C \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G$ is roughly

$$1/2 - \text{ExpBias} \left[(C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G \right]$$

for some δ -random function g . As we noted in the previous section, it will be sufficient for G to be *indistinguishability-preserving*. We give the definition of indistinguishability-preserving and then our main result.

Definition 5.1. A generator $G : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ is said to be indistinguishability-preserving for size t if for all (possibly probabilistic) functions $f_1, \dots, f_k, g_1, \dots, g_k$ the following holds:

If for every $i, 1 \leq i \leq k$ the distributions

$$U_n \cdot f_i(U_n) \text{ and } U_n \cdot g_i(U_n)$$

are ϵ -indistinguishable for size s , then

$$\sigma \cdot f_1(X_1) \cdots f_k(X_k) \text{ and } \sigma \cdot g_1(X_1) \cdots g_k(X_k)$$

are $k\epsilon$ -indistinguishable for size $s - t$, where σ is a random seed of length l and $X_1 \cdots X_k$ is the output of $G(\sigma)$.

Lemma 5.2. *Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be δ -hard for size s , let $G : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ be a generator that is indistinguishability-preserving for size t and let $C : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be any function. Then there exists a δ' -random g , with $\delta \leq \delta' \leq 2\delta$ such that the function $(C \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ has hardness*

$$\frac{1}{2} - \frac{\text{ExpBias}[(C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G]}{2} - \frac{k}{s^{1/3}}$$

for circuits of size $\Omega(s^{1/3}/\log(1/\delta)) - t - \text{size}(C)$ where $\text{size}(C)$ denotes the size of a smallest circuit computing C .

Proof. By Lemma 3.2, there exists a δ' -random function g with $\delta \leq \delta' \leq 2\delta$, such that $U_n \cdot f(U_n)$ and $U_n \cdot g(U_n)$ are ϵ -indistinguishable for size $\Omega(s\epsilon^2, \log(1/\delta))$. Since G is a indistinguishability-preserving for size t by assumption, this implies that

$$\sigma \cdot f(X_1) \cdots f(X_k) \text{ and } \sigma \cdot g(X_1) \cdots g(X_k)$$

are $k\epsilon$ -indistinguishable for size $\Omega(s\epsilon^2 \log(1/\delta)) - t$, where here and below σ denotes a uniform random seed in $\{0, 1\}^l$ and $X_1 \cdots X_k$ will denote the output of $G(\sigma)$. This in turn implies that

$$\begin{aligned} & \sigma \cdot C(f(X_1) \cdots f(X_k)) \text{ and } \sigma \cdot C(g(X_1) \cdots g(X_k)) \\ & \text{(i.e., } \sigma \cdot (C \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G(\sigma) \text{ and } \sigma \cdot (C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G(\sigma) \text{)} \end{aligned}$$

are $k\epsilon$ -indistinguishable for size $\Omega(s\epsilon^2/\log(1/\delta)) - t - \text{size}(C)$. By Lemma 3.4,

$$\sigma \cdot (C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G \text{ and } \sigma \cdot U_1$$

are $(\text{ExpBias}[(C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G] / 2)$ -indistinguishable for any size. Therefore, we have that

$$\sigma \cdot (C \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G \text{ and } \sigma \cdot U_1$$

are $(\text{ExpBias}[(C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G] / 2 + k\epsilon)$ -indistinguishable for size $\Omega(s\epsilon^2/\log(1/\delta)) - t - \text{size}(C)$. The result follows by setting $\epsilon = 1/s^{1/3}$ and applying Lemma 2.3. \square

In particular, we note that the *identity generator* $G : \{0, 1\}^{nk} \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$, i.e. $G(x) = x$, is indistinguishability-preserving for size 0 (by a hybrid argument), and thus Lemma 3.5 is a corollary of Lemma 5.2. However, the identity generator has seed-length nk and is therefore a very poor pseudorandom generator. Fortunately, there are indistinguishability-preserving pseudorandom generators with much shorter seeds which will allow us to use Lemma 5.2 to obtain much stronger hardness amplifications.

Lemma 5.3. *There is a constant c such that for every $n \geq 2$ and every $k = k(n)$ there is an explicitly computable generator $IP_k : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ with seed length $l = c \cdot n^2$ that is indistinguishability-preserving for size k^2 .*

Proof. The generator is due to Nisan and Nisan and Wigderson [Nis1, NW], and is based on combinatorial designs. Specifically, we let $S_1, \dots, S_k \subseteq [l]$ be an explicit family of sets such that $|S_i| = n$ for all i , and $|S_i \cap S_j| \leq \log k$ for all $i \neq j$. Nisan [Nis1] gives an explicit construction of such sets with $l = O(n^2)$. Then the generator $IP_k : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ is defined by $IP_k(\sigma) := (\sigma|_{S_1}, \dots, \sigma|_{S_k})$, where $\sigma|_{S_i} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ denotes the projection of σ onto the coordinates indexed by the set S_i . The proof that this generator is indistinguishability preserving for size $k \cdot 2^{\max_{i \neq j} |S_i \cap S_j|} \leq k^2$ follows the arguments in [NW, STV]. \square

6 Fooling the Expected Bias

In this section we prove a derandomized version of Lemma 3.7. Informally, we show that if C is computable in a restricted model of computation and G “fools” that restricted model of computation, then for any δ -random function g :

$$\text{ExpBias} \left[(C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G \right] \leq \sqrt{\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C] + \epsilon}.$$

The restricted model of computation we consider is that of nonuniform space-bounded algorithms which make one pass through the input, reading it in blocks of length n . These are formally modeled by the following kind of branching programs.

Definition 6.1. *A (probabilistic, read-once, oblivious) branching program of size s with block-size n is a finite state machine with s states, over the alphabet $\{0, 1\}^n$ (with a fixed start state, and an arbitrary number of accepting states). Each edge is labelled with a symbol in $\{0, 1\}^n$. For every state a and symbol $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}^n$, the edges leaving a and labelled with α are assigned a probability distribution. Then computation proceeds as follows. The input is read sequentially, one block of n bits at a time. If the machine is in state a and it reads α , then it chooses an edge leaving a and labelled with α according to its probability, and moves along it. The width of a branching program is the maximum, over i , of the number of states that are reachable after reading i symbols.*

Intuitively, the space of the algorithm is the logarithm of the width. Now we formally define pseudorandom generators against branching programs.

Definition 6.2. *A generator $G : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ is ϵ -pseudorandom against branching programs of size s and block-size n if for every branching program B of size s and block-size n :*

$$\left| \Pr[B(G(U_l)) = 1] - \Pr[B(U_{nk}) = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon.$$

In [Nis2], Nisan builds an unconditional pseudorandom generator against branching programs. Its parameters (specialized for our purposes) are given in the following theorem.

Theorem 6.3 ([Nis2]). *For every n and $k \leq 2^n$, there exists a generator*

$$N_k : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$$

such that:

- N_k is 2^{-n} -pseudorandom against branching programs of size 2^n and block-size n .
- N_k has seed length $l = O(n \log k)$.
- N_k is explicitly computable.

Note that Nisan [Nis2] does not mention *probabilistic* branching programs. However, if there is a probabilistic branching program distinguishing the output of the generator from uniform, then by a fixing of the coin tosses of the branching program there is a *deterministic* branching program that distinguishes the output of the generator from uniform.

We now state the derandomized version of Lemma 3.7.

Lemma 6.4. *Let*

- $g : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ *be a δ -random function,*
- $C : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ *be computable by a branching program of width w and block-size 1,*
- $G : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ *be $\epsilon/2$ -pseudorandom against branching programs of size $k \cdot w^2$ and block-size n .*

Then $\text{ExpBias}[(C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G] \leq \sqrt{\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C] + \epsilon}$.

Proof. We will not show that G fools the expected bias, but rather the following related quantity. For a probabilistic boolean function $h(x; r)$ we define its (normalized) *expected collision probability* as

$$\text{ExpCP}[h] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbb{E}_x [2 \cdot \Pr_{r, r'}[h(x; r) = h(x; r')] - 1].$$

The same reasoning that shows Lemma 3.7, shows that for every probabilistic boolean function h :

$$\text{ExpBias}[h] \leq \sqrt{\text{ExpCP}[h]}. \quad (3)$$

Let $h(x; r) : (\{0, 1\}^n)^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be the probabilistic function $C \circ g^{\otimes k}$. Even though h is defined in terms of g , it turns out that its expected collision probability is the same for all δ -random functions g . Specifically, for $x = (x_1, \dots, x_k)$, the only dependence of the collision probability $\Pr_{r, r'}[h(x; r) = h(x; r')]$ on x_i comes from whether $g(x_i)$ is a coin flip (which occurs with probability δ over the choice of x_i), $g(x_i) = 1$ (which occurs with probability $(1 - \delta)/2$), or $g(x_i) = 0$ (which occurs with probability $(1 - \delta)/2$). In the case where $g(x_i)$ is a coin flip, then the i 'th bits of the two inputs fed to C are random and independent, and otherwise they are equal and fixed (according to $g(x_i)$). It can be verified that this corresponds precisely to the definition of noise stability, so we have:

$$\text{ExpCP}[h] = \text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C]. \quad (4)$$

Now we construct a probabilistic branching program $M : (\{0, 1\}^n)^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ of width w^2 , size kw^2 and block-size n such that for every $x \in (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$:

$$\Pr[M(x) = 1] = \Pr_{r, r'}[h(x; r) = h(x; r')].$$

To do this, we first note that, using the branching program for C , we can build a probabilistic branching program with block-size n and width w which computes $C \circ g^{\otimes k}$: The states of the branching program are the same as those of the branching program for C , and we define the transitions as follows. Upon reading symbol $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}^n$ in state s , if $g(\alpha) = 0$ (resp. $g(\alpha) = 1$), we deterministically go to the state given by the 0-transition (resp., 1-transition) of C from state s , and if $g(\alpha)$ is a coin flip, then we put equal probability on these two transitions.

Then, to obtain M , run two *independent* copies of this branching program (i.e., using independent choices for the probabilistic state transitions) and accept if and only if exactly one of the two

copies accepts. Now,

$$\begin{aligned}
& \left| \text{ExpCP}[(C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G] - \text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C] \right| \\
&= \left| \text{ExpCP}[(C \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G] - \text{ExpCP}[C \circ g^{\otimes k}] \right| \quad (\text{by (4)}) \\
&= 2 \cdot \left| \Pr[M \circ G(U_l) = 1] - \Pr[M(U_{n \cdot k}) = 1] \right| \\
&\leq \epsilon. \quad (\text{by pseudorandomness of } G)
\end{aligned}$$

The lemma follows combining this with Equation (3). \square

7 Amplification up to $1/2 - 1/\text{poly}$

In this section we sketch our hardness amplification up to $1/2 + 1/n^c$, for every c :

Theorem 7.1. *If there is a balanced $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ in \mathcal{NP} that is $(1/3)$ -hard for size $s(n) \geq n^{\omega(1)}$, then for every $c > 0$ there is a function $f' : \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ in \mathcal{NP} that is $(1/2 - 1/m^c)$ -hard for size $(s(\sqrt{m}))^{\Omega(1)}$.*

To amplify we use the TRIBES function of Ben-Or and Linial [BL], a monotone read-once DNF.

Definition 7.2. *The TRIBES function on k bits is:*

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{TRIBES}_k(x_1, \dots, x_k) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \\
& (x_1 \wedge \dots \wedge x_b) \vee (x_{b+1} \wedge \dots \wedge x_{2b}) \vee \dots \vee (x_{k-b+1} \wedge \dots \wedge x_k)
\end{aligned}$$

where there are k/b clauses each of size b , and b is the largest integer such that $(1 - 2^{-b})^{k/b} \geq 1/2$. Note that this makes $b = O(\log k)$.

The TRIBES DNF has very low noise stability when perturbed with constant noise.

Lemma 7.3 ([O'D, MO]). *For every constant $\delta > 0$,*

$$\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[\text{TRIBES}_k] \leq \frac{1}{k^{\Omega(1)}}.$$

A key step in our result is that TRIBES_k is (trivially) computable by a branching program of width 3, and therefore we can use Lemma 6.4 to fool its expected bias.

We now define the generator we will use in our derandomized direct product construction.

Definition 7.4. *Given n and $k \leq 2^n$, define the generator $\Gamma_k : \{0,1\}^m \rightarrow (\{0,1\}^n)^k$ as follows:*

$$\Gamma_k(x, y) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} IP_k(x) \oplus N_k(y),$$

where \oplus denotes bitwise XOR.

We recall the properties of Γ we are interested in:

Lemma 7.5. *The following hold:*

1. Γ_k is indistinguishability-preserving for size k^2 .

2. Γ_k is 2^{-n} -pseudorandom against branching programs of size 2^n and block-size n .

3. Γ_k has seed length $m = O(n^2)$.

4. Γ_k is explicitly computable (see Definition 4.2 for the definition of explicit).

Proof. (1) By Lemma 5.3 and the fact that an indistinguishability-preserving generator XORed with any fixed string (in particular, $N_k(y)$ for any y) is still indistinguishability-preserving. (2) By Theorem 6.3 and the fact that XORing with any fixed string (in particular, $IP_k(x)$ for any x) preserves pseudorandomness against branching programs. (3) By the seed lengths of IP_k (Lemma 5.3) and N_k (Theorem 6.3). (4) Because IP_k is explicit (Lemma 5.3) and N_k is explicit (Theorem 6.3). \square

Proof of Theorem 7.1. Given $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is δ -hard for size $s(n)$ (for $\delta = 1/3$) and a constant c , let $k = n^{c'}$ for $c' = O(c)$ to be determined later. Consider the function $f' : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ defined by

$$f' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\text{TRIBES}_k \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ \Gamma_k.$$

Note that $f' \in \mathcal{NP}$ since $f \in \mathcal{NP}$, TRIBES is monotone and both Γ and TRIBES are efficiently computable.

We now analyze the hardness of f' . Since Γ_k is indistinguishability-preserving for size k^2 by Lemma 7.5, Lemma 5.2 implies that there is a δ' -random function g (for $\delta \leq \delta' \leq 2\delta$) such that f' has hardness

$$\frac{1}{2} - \frac{\text{ExpBias}[(\text{TRIBES}_k \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ \Gamma_k]}{2} - \frac{k}{s(n)^{1/3}} \quad (5)$$

for circuits of size $\Omega((s(n)^{1/3}) - k^2 - \text{size}(\text{TRIBES}_k))$. Next we bound the hardness. By Lemma 7.5, we know that Γ_k is 2^{-n} -pseudorandom against branching programs of size 2^n and block-size n . In particular, since $k = \text{poly}(n)$, Γ_k is $1/k$ -pseudorandom against branching programs of size $9k$ and block-size n . Since TRIBES_k is trivially computable by a branching program of width 3, we can apply Lemma 6.4 in order to bound $\text{ExpBias}[(\text{TRIBES}_k \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ \Gamma_k]$ by $\sqrt{\text{NoiseStab}_{\delta'}[\text{TRIBES}_k]} + 2/k$. And this noise stability is at most $1/k^{\Omega(1)}$ by Lemma 7.3. Since $k = \text{poly}(n)$ and $s(n) = n^{\omega(1)}$, the $k/s^{1/3}$ term in the hardness (5) is negligible and we obtain hardness at least $1/2 - 1/k^{\Omega(1)}$.

We now bound the circuit size: Since TRIBES_k is computable by circuits of size $O(k)$, and $s(n) = n^{\omega(1)}$, the size is at least $s(n)^{\Omega(1)}$.

To conclude, note that f' has input length $m = n^2$ by Lemma 7.5. The result then follows by an appropriate choice of $c' = O(c)$. \square

8 Using Nondeterminism

In this section we discuss how to use nondeterminism to get the following theorem.

Theorem 8.1. *If there is a balanced $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ in \mathcal{NP} that is $(1/3)$ -hard for size $s(n)$, then there is an $f' : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ in \mathcal{NP} that is $(1/2 - 1/s(\sqrt{m})^{\Omega(1)})$ -hard for size $s(\sqrt{m})^{\Omega(1)}$.*

Our main observation is that TRIBES_k is a DNF with clause size $O(\log k)$, and therefore it is computable in nondeterministic time $\text{poly}(n)$ even when k is superpolynomial in n :

Lemma 8.2. *Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be in \mathcal{NP} , and let $G_k : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ be any explicitly computable generator (see Definition 4.2) with $l \geq n$. Then the function $f' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\text{TRIBES}_k \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G_k$ is computable in \mathcal{NP} for every $k = k(n) \leq 2^n$.*

Proof. We compute $f'(\sigma)$ nondeterministically as follows: Guess a clause $v_i \wedge v_{i+1} \wedge \dots \wedge v_j$ in TRIBES_k . Accept if for every h s.t. $i \leq h \leq j$ we have $f(X_h) = 1$, where $G(\sigma) = (X_1, \dots, X_k)$ and the values $f(X_h)$ are computed using the \mathcal{NP} algorithm for f .

It can be verified that this algorithm has an accepting computation path on input σ iff $f'(\sigma) = 1$. Note that the clauses have size logarithmic in k , which is polynomial in n . Moreover, G is explicitly computable. The result follows. \square

Now the proof of Theorem 8.1 proceeds along the same lines as the proof of Theorem 7.1, setting $k \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} s(n)^{\Omega(1)}$.

9 Amplifying from Hardness $1/\text{poly}$

Our amplification from hardness $\Omega(1)$ to $1/2 - \epsilon$ (Theorem 7.1) can be combined with O'Donnell's amplification from hardness $1/\text{poly}$ to hardness $\Omega(1)$ to obtain an amplification from $1/\text{poly}$ to $1/2 - \epsilon$. However, since O'Donnell's construction blows up the input length polynomially, we would only obtain $\epsilon = 1/s(n^{\Omega(1)})$ (where the hidden constant depends on the initial polynomial hardness) rather than $\epsilon = 1/s(\sqrt{n})^{\Omega(1)}$ (as in Theorem 7.1). Thus we show here how to amplify directly from $1/\text{poly}$ to $1/2 - \epsilon$ using our approach. For this we need a combining function C that is more involved than the TRIBES function. The properties of C that are needed in the proof of Theorem 4.1 are captured by the following lemma.

Lemma 9.1. *For every $\delta(n) = 1/n^{O(1)}$, there is a sequence of functions $C_k : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, such that for every $k = k(n)$ with $n^{\omega(1)} \leq k \leq 2^n$, the following hold:*

1. $\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[C_k] \leq 1/k^{\Omega(1)}$.
2. For every $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ in \mathcal{NP} and every explicitly computable generator (see Definition 4.2) $G_k : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ with $l \geq n$, the function $(C_k \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G_k$ is in \mathcal{NP} .
3. C_k can be computed by a (read-once, oblivious) branching program of width $n^{O(1)}$.

Before proving Lemma 9.1, let us see how it can be used to prove our main theorem.

Theorem 9.2 (Thm. 4.1, restated). *If there is a balanced $f \in \mathcal{NP}$, $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is $1/\text{poly}(n)$ -hard for size $s(n)$, then there is $f' \in \mathcal{NP}$, $f' : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is $(1/2 - 1/s(\sqrt{m})^{\Omega(1)})$ -hard for size $s(\sqrt{m})^{\Omega(1)}$.*

Proof. Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be a balanced function in \mathcal{NP} that is $\delta = \delta(n)$ -hard for size $s(n)$, where $\delta \geq 1/n^{O(1)}$. Let $k = k(n) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} s(n)^{1/7}$ and let C_k be the function guaranteed by Lemma 9.1. Let Γ_k be the generator from Definition 7.4. Consider the function $f' : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ defined by $f' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (C_k \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ \Gamma_k$. Note that $f' \in \mathcal{NP}$ by Item 2 in Lemma 9.1.

We now analyze the hardness of f' . Since Γ_k is indistinguishability-preserving for size k^2 (by Lemma 7.5), Lemma 5.2 implies that there is a δ' -random function g (for $\delta \leq \delta' \leq 2\delta$) such that f' has hardness

$$\alpha(m) = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\text{ExpBias}[(C_k \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ \Gamma_k]}{2} - \frac{k}{s(n)^{1/3}} \quad (6)$$

for circuits of size

$$s'(m) = \Omega\left(\frac{s(n)^{1/3}}{\log(1/\delta)}\right) - k^2 - \text{size}(C_k).$$

We first bound the hardness $\alpha(m)$. By Lemma 7.5, we know that Γ_k is 2^{-n} -pseudorandom against branching programs of size 2^n and block-size n . Since the branching program for computing C_k has width $w = n^{O(1)}$, we have $k \cdot w^2 < 2^n$, so we may apply Lemma 6.4 in order to bound $\text{ExpBias}[(C_k \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ \Gamma_k]$ by $\sqrt{\text{NoiseStab}_{\delta'}[C_k] + 2/2^n}$. This noise stability is at most $1/k^{\Omega(1)}$ by Item 1 in Lemma 9.1. Using the fact that $k = s(n)^{1/7}$, we have

$$\alpha(m) \geq \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\sqrt{1/k^{\Omega(1)} - 2/2^n}}{2} - \frac{k}{s(n)^{1/3}} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{s(n)^{\Omega(1)}}.$$

We now bound the circuit size $s'(m)$. Since C_k is computable by a branching program of width $w = \text{poly}(n)$ it is also computable by a circuit of size $\text{poly}(n) \cdot k$. So $\text{size}(C_k) \leq \text{poly}(n) \cdot k$. Since $\log(1/\delta) = O(\log n)$ and $s(n) = n^{\omega(1)}$, we have

$$s'(m) = \Omega\left(\frac{s(n)^{1/3}}{\log n}\right) - s(n)^{2/7} - \text{poly}(n) = s(n)^{\Omega(1)}.$$

To conclude, we note that f' has input length $m = O(n^2)$ by Lemma 7.5, so $s(n) = s(\Omega(\sqrt{m})) = s(\sqrt{m})^{\Omega(1)}$, and we indeed obtain hardness $\alpha(m) = 1/2 - 1/s(\sqrt{m})^{\Omega(1)}$ for size $s'(m) = s(\sqrt{m})^{\Omega(1)}$. \square

The rest of this section is devoted to the proof of Lemma 9.1. Recall that amplification from hardness $\Omega(1)$ (Theorem 7.1) relies on the fact that the TRIBES DNF has low noise stability with respect to noise parameter $\delta = \Omega(1)$ (i.e., Lemma 7.3). Similarly, to amplify from hardness $1/\text{poly}(n)$ we need to employ a combining function that has low noise stability with respect to noise $1/\text{poly}(n)$. To this end, following [O'D], we employ the recursive-majorities function, RMAJ_r . Let MAJ denote the majority function.

Definition 9.3. *The RMAJ_r function on 3^r bits is defined recursively by:*

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RMAJ}_1(x_1, x_2, x_3) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{MAJ}(x_1, x_2, x_3) \\ \text{RMAJ}_r(x_1, \dots, x_{3^r}) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \\ \text{RMAJ}_{r-1}(\text{MAJ}(x_1, x_2, x_3), \dots, \text{MAJ}(x_{3^{r-2}}, x_{3^{r-1}}, x_{3^n})) \end{aligned}$$

The following lemma quantifies the noise stability of RMAJ .

Lemma 9.4 ([O'D], Prop. 11). *There is a constant c such that for every $\delta > 0$ and every $r \geq c \cdot \log(1/\delta)$, we have*

$$\text{NoiseStab}_{\delta}[\text{RMAJ}_r] \leq \frac{1}{4}.$$

Note that if $r = O(\log n)$ then RMAJ_r is a function of $3^r = \text{poly}(n)$ bits. This is important because, unlike TRIBES (cf., Lemma 8.2), we do not know how to compute the recursive majority of superpolynomially many input bits in \mathcal{NP} . However, when $r = O(\log n)$, RMAJ_r does not have sufficiently low noise stability to be used on its own. For this reason, we will combine RMAJ with TRIBES. (The same combination of RMAJ and TRIBES is employed by O’Donnell, albeit for a different setting of parameters.)

Proof of Lemma 9.1. Given n and $\delta = \delta(n) \geq 1/n^{O(1)}$, let $r \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} c \cdot \log(1/\delta)$ for a constant c to be chosen later. Assume, without loss of generality, that r and $k/3^r$ are integers. The function $C_k : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is defined as follows

$$C_k \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{TRIBES}_{k/3^r} \circ \text{RMAJ}_r^{\otimes k}.$$

We now prove that C_k satisfies the required properties.

1. We will use the following result from [O’D].

Lemma 9.5 ([O’D], Proposition 8). *If h is a balanced boolean function and $\varphi : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is any boolean function, then*

$$\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[\varphi \circ h^{\otimes k}] = \text{NoiseStab}_{\frac{1}{2} - \frac{\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[h]}{2}}[\varphi].$$

Letting c be a sufficiently large constant (recall that $r = c \cdot \log(1/\delta)$), by Lemma 9.4 we have that $\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[\text{RMAJ}_r]/2 \geq 1/2 - 1/8 \geq 3/8$. Now note that RMAJ_r is balanced because taking the bitwise complement of an input x also negates the value of $\text{RMAJ}_r(x)$. Hence, by Lemma 9.5,

$$\text{NoiseStab}_\delta[\text{TRIBES}_{k/3^r} \circ \text{RMAJ}_r^{\otimes k}] = \text{NoiseStab}_{3/8}[\text{TRIBES}_{k/3^r}] \leq \frac{1}{(k/3^r)^{\Omega(1)}} = \frac{1}{k^{\Omega(1)}},$$

where the last two equalities use Lemma 7.3 and the fact that $k = n^{\omega(1)}$ and $r = O(\log n)$.

2. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 8.2. To compute $(\text{TRIBES}_{k/3^r} \circ \text{RMAJ}_r^{\otimes k} \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ G_k$, we guess a clause of the $\text{TRIBES}_{k/3^r}$ and verify that all the RMAJ_r evaluations feeding into it are satisfied (using the \mathcal{NP} algorithm for f). The only additional observation is that each of the recursive majorities depends only on $3^r = \text{poly}(n)$ bits of the input, and hence can be computed in time polynomial in n .
3. As noted earlier, $\text{TRIBES}_{k/3^r}$ is computable by a branching program of width 3. RMAJ_r , on the other hand, can be computed by a branching program of width $2^{O(r)} = n^{O(1)}$ as follows. Consider a non-uniform algorithm with a stack that reads the inputs to RMAJ_r in order, placing them on the stack; every time the stack contains the values of all 3 inputs to some MAJ, it replaces them with the value of their majority. Using non-uniformity to determine when such triples can be collapsed, the only space requirement is the stack of size $O(r)$. (It is not hard to see that a stack of size $O(r)$ always suffices.) Therefore this non-uniform space-bounded computation can be performed by a branching program of width $2^{O(r)}$. By composing the (constant width) branching program for TRIBES with the branching program for RMAJ, we can compute C_k by a branching program of width $2^{O(r)} = n^{O(1)}$.

□

10 On the Possibility of Amplifying Hardness up to $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(n)}$

Even when starting from a function that is δ -hard for size $2^{\Omega(n)}$, our results (Theorem 4.1) only amplify hardness up to $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})}$ (rather than $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(n)}$). In this section we discuss the possibility of amplifying hardness in \mathcal{NP} up to $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(n)}$, when starting with a function that is δ -hard for size $2^{\Omega(n)}$. The problem is that the seed length of our generator in Lemma 7.5 is *quadratic* in n , rather than linear. To amplify hardness up to $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(n)}$ we need a generator (for every $k = 2^{\Omega(n)}$) with the same properties of the one in Lemma 7.5, but with linear seed length.

Recall our generator is the XOR of an indistinguishability-preserving generator and a generator that is pseudorandom against branching programs. While it is an open problem to exhibit a generator with linear seed length that is pseudorandom against branching programs, an indistinguishability-preserving generator with linear seed length is given by the following lemma.

Lemma 10.1. *For every constant γ , $0 < \gamma < 1$, there is a constant c such that for every n there is an explicitly computable generator $IP'_{2^{n/c}} : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^{2^{n/c}}$ with seed length $l = c \cdot n$ that is indistinguishability-preserving for size $2^{\gamma n}$.*

Proof. The generator is due to Nisan and Wigderson [NW] and Impagliazzo and Wigderson [IW1]. It is the same generator as the one used in Lemma 5.3, except we require a design consisting of $2^{\Omega(n)}$ sets of size n in a universe of size $O(n)$, with pairwise intersections of size at most $\gamma n/2$. An explicit construction of such a design is given in [GV].³ \square

Theorem 10.2. *Suppose that there exists an explicit generator $N'_{2^n} : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^{2^n}$ that is 2^{-n} -pseudorandom against branching programs of size 2^n and block-size n and that has seed length $l = O(n)$. Then the following holds: If there is a balanced $f \in \mathcal{NP}$, $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is $1/\text{poly}(n)$ -hard for size $2^{\Omega(n)}$, then there is $f' \in \mathcal{NP}$, $f' : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is $(1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(n)})$ -hard for size $2^{\Omega(n)}$.*

For amplifying from constant hardness, it suffices to instead have a generator fooling *constant-depth circuits* of size 2^n with seed length $O(n)$. (The generator of Nisan [Nis1] has seed length $\text{poly}(n)$.) The reason is that our proof that PRGs versus branching programs “fool” the expected bias also works for PRGs versus constant-depth circuits, provided that the combining function is computable in constant depth. The TRIBES function is depth 2 by definition (but the recursive majorities RMAJ is not constant-depth, and hence this would only amplify from constant hardness).

More generally, we only need, for every constant $\gamma > 0$, a generator $G : \{0, 1\}^{O(n)} \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ where $k = 2^{\gamma n}$ such that for every δ -random function g ,

$$\text{ExpBias} \left[(C_k \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ G \right] = 2^{-\Omega(n)},$$

where, for example, $C_k = \text{TRIBES}_k$ (when δ is constant). As in the proof of Lemma 3.7, in proving such a statement, it may be convenient to work instead with the (polynomially related) expected collision probability. An important property of $C_k = \text{TRIBES}_k$ we used in bounding the expected bias with respect to G is that it gives expected bias $2^{-\Omega(n)}$ if G is replaced with a truly random generator (i.e. using seed length $n \cdot k$) and δ is constant. One might try to use a different monotone

³In [IW1] they give a randomized algorithm, using $O(n)$ random bits, such that with probability exponentially close to 1, the algorithm explicitly computes such sets S_1, \dots, S_M with $l = O(n)$. This is sufficient for computing an indistinguishability-preserving generator.

combining function with this property, provided it can also be evaluated in nondeterministic time $\text{poly}(n)$.

11 On the balancing hypothesis

The hardness amplification results in the previous sections start from balanced functions. In this section we study this hypothesis. Our main finding is that, while this hypothesis is not necessary for hardness amplification within \mathcal{NP}/poly (i.e., non-deterministic polynomial size circuits), it is likely to be necessary for hardness amplification within \mathcal{NP} .

To see that this hypothesis is not necessary for amplification within \mathcal{NP}/poly , note that if the quantity $\Pr_x[f(x) = 1]$ of the original hard function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is known, then we can easily pad f to obtain a balanced function $\bar{f} : \{0, 1\}^{n+1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$:

$$\bar{f}(x, p) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} f(x) & \text{if } p = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } p = 1 \text{ and } x \leq \Pr_x[f(x) = 1] \cdot 2^n \\ 1 & \text{if } p = 1 \text{ and } x > \Pr_x[f(x) = 1] \cdot 2^n \end{cases}$$

It is easy to see that \bar{f} is $1/\text{poly}(n)$ -hard if f is. Since a circuit can (non-uniformly) know $\Pr_x[f(x) = 1]$, the following hardness amplification within \mathcal{NP}/poly is a corollary to the proof of Theorem 4.1.

Corollary 11.1. *If there is an $f \in \mathcal{NP}/\text{poly}$, $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is $1/\text{poly}(n)$ -hard for size $s(n)$, then there is $f' \in \mathcal{NP}/\text{poly}$, $f' : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ that is $(1/2 - 1/s(\sqrt{m})^{\Omega(1)})$ -hard for size $s(\sqrt{m})^{\Omega(1)}$.*

Now we return to hardness amplification within \mathcal{NP} . First we note that, in our results, to amplify the hardness of $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ up to $1/2 - \epsilon$ it is only necessary that $\text{Bias}[f] \leq \epsilon^c$ for some universal constant c . The argument is standard and can be found, for example, in [Tre].

Combining this observation with the above padding technique, O’Donnell constructs several candidate hard functions, one for each ‘guess’ of the bias of the original hard function. He then combines them in a single function using a different input length for each candidate; this gives a function that is very hard on average for infinitely many input lengths. However, this approach, even in conjunction with derandomization and nondeterminism, cannot give better hardness than $1/2 - 1/n$. (Roughly speaking, if we want to amplify to $1/2 - \epsilon$, then we will have at least $1/\epsilon$ different candidates and thus the “hard” candidate may have input length $n \geq 1/\epsilon$, which means $1/2 - \epsilon \leq 1/2 - 1/n$.)

To what extent can we amplify the hardness of functions whose bias is *unknown*? Non-monotone hardness amplifications, such as Yao’s XOR Lemma, work regardless of the bias of the original hard function. However, in the rest of this section we show that, for hardness amplifications that are *monotone* and *black-box*, this is impossible. In particular, we show that black-box monotone hardness amplifications cannot amplify the hardness beyond the bias of the original function.

We now formalize the notion of black-box monotone hardness amplification and then state our negative result.

Definition 11.2. *An oracle algorithm $\text{Amp} : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is a black-box β -bias $[\delta \mapsto (1/2 - \epsilon)]$ -hardness amplification for length n and size s if for every $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $\text{Bias}[f] \leq \beta$*

and for every $A : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that

$$\Pr[A(U_l) \neq \text{Amp}^f(U_l)] \leq 1/2 - \epsilon,$$

there is an oracle circuit C of size at most s such that

$$\Pr[C^A(U_n) \neq f(U_n)] \leq \delta.$$

Amp is monotone if for every x , $\text{Amp}^f(x)$ is a monotone function of the truth table of f .

Note that if *Amp* is as in Definition 11.2 and if f is δ -hard for size s' and $\text{Bias}[f] \leq \beta$, then Amp^f is $(1/2 - \epsilon)$ -hard for size s'/s : if there were a circuit A of size s'/s computing Amp^f with error probability at most $1/2 - \epsilon$, then C^A would be a circuit of size $s \cdot (s'/s) = s'$ computing f with error probability at most δ , contradicting the hardness of f . The term “black box” refers to the fact that the definition requires this to hold for *every* f and A , regardless of whether or not f is in \mathcal{NP} and A is a small circuit.

Theorem 11.3. *For any constant $\theta > 0$, if *Amp* is a monotone black-box β -bias $[\delta \mapsto (1/2 - \epsilon)]$ -hardness amplification for length n and size $s \leq 2^{n/3}$ such that $1/2 - 2\epsilon > \delta + \theta$, then $\beta \leq 4\epsilon + O(2^{-n})$.*

The main ideas for proving this bound are the same as in the negative result for black-box hardness amplification in [Viol]: First we show that the above kind of hardness amplification satisfies certain coding-like properties. (Roughly, *Amp* can be seen as a kind of list-decodable code where the distance property is guaranteed only for δ -distant messages with bias at most β (cf., [Tre]).) Then we show that monotone functions fail to satisfy these properties. The limitation we prove on monotone functions relies on the Kruskal-Katona theorem (see [And]). In particular, we use the following corollary to the Kruskal-Katona theorem.

Lemma 11.4. *Let $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be a monotone function, and let \mathcal{S}_k be the uniform distribution on n -bit strings of Hamming weight k (i.e., having exactly k ones). Then for every integer $k, 0 \leq k \leq n/2$, either*

$$\text{Bias}_{x \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_k}[f(x)] \geq 1 - \frac{2k}{n} \quad \text{or} \quad \text{Bias}_{x \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_{n-k}}[f(x)] \geq 1 - \frac{2k}{n}.$$

The following lemma captures the coding-like properties of monotone, black-box hardness amplifications — it shows that it is very unlikely that Amp^f for a “random f ” will land in any fixed Hamming ball of radius $1/2 - \epsilon$. Let \mathcal{F}_p be the uniform distribution on functions f whose truth tables have relative Hamming weight exactly p , i.e. $\Pr_x[f(x) = 1] = p$. For two functions f_1, f_2 , let Dist denote the Hamming distance of their truth tables, i.e. $\text{Dist}(f_1, f_2) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Pr_x[f_1(x) \neq f_2(x)]$.

Lemma 11.5. *Let *Amp* be a monotone black-box β -bias $[\delta \mapsto (1/2 - \epsilon)]$ -hardness amplification for length n and size $s \leq 2^{n/3}$, where $1/2 - \beta/2 > \delta + \gamma$ and $1/2 - \beta/2 = d/2^n$ for some integer d . Then for both p in $\{1/2 - \beta/2, 1/2 + \beta/2\}$ and every function G :*

$$\Pr_{F \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_p} [\text{Dist}(G, \text{Amp}^F) \leq 1/2 - \epsilon] \leq 2^{-\Omega(2^n)}.$$

Proof. Let $N \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 2^n$. For every function f of bias at most β such that $\text{Dist}(G, \text{Amp}^f) \leq 1/2 - \epsilon$, there must exist a circuit of size s , with oracle access to G , that computes f with error at most δ . Therefore, since there are $2^{O(s \log s)}$ circuits of size s and no more than $2^{H(\delta)N}$ functions that are at distance at most δ from f , there are at most $2^{O(s \log s)} 2^{H(\delta)N}$ such functions. Thus, when we restrict our attention to the $\binom{N}{p}$ functions in \mathcal{F}_p , we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{F \in \mathcal{F}_p} [\text{Dist}(G, \text{Amp}^F) \leq 1/2 - \epsilon] &\leq \frac{2^{O(s \log s)} \cdot 2^{H(\delta)N}}{\binom{N}{p}} \\ &\leq 2^{O(s \log s)} \cdot (N+1) \cdot 2^{(H(\delta) - H(p))N} \\ &\leq 2^{O(s \log s)} \cdot (N+1) \cdot 2^{(H(\delta) - H(1/2 - \beta))N} \\ &\leq 2^{-\Omega(N)}. \end{aligned}$$

□

Proof of Theorem 11.3. It will be convenient to assume that $1/2 - \beta/2 = d/2^n$ for some integer d . Because the conclusion of the theorem only bounds β up to an additive term of size $O(2^{-n})$, this assumption is without loss of generality. We may also assume that $\beta \leq 4\epsilon + \theta$ because a β -bias hardness amplification is also a β' -bias hardness amplification for any $\beta' \leq \beta$, and $4\epsilon + \theta > 4\epsilon + O(2^{-n})$.

By Lemma 11.4, we may choose $p \in \{1/2 - \beta/2, 1/2 + \beta/2\}$ such that for at least half of the $x \in \{0, 1\}^l$, $\text{Bias}_{F \in \mathcal{F}_p}[\text{Amp}^F(x)]$ is at least β . Define the function $G(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{MAJ}_{F \in \mathcal{F}_p} \text{Amp}^F(x)$. Now consider

$$\Pr_{U_l, F \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_p} [\text{Amp}^F(U_l) \neq G(U_l)]. \quad (7)$$

We now apply Lemma 11.5, setting $\gamma = \theta/2$. Note that the hypothesis is satisfied because $1/2 - \beta/2 \geq 1/2 - (4\epsilon + \theta)/2 > \delta + \theta/2$. Thus, we conclude that Quantity (7) is at least $1/2 - \epsilon - 2^{-\Omega(2^n)}$.

On the other hand:

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr_{U_l, F \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_p} [\text{Amp}^F(U_l) \neq G(U_l)] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_{U_l} \left[\Pr_{F \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_p} [\text{Amp}^F(U_l) \neq G(U_l)] \right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_{U_l} \left[\frac{1}{2} - \frac{\text{Bias}_{F \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_p}[\text{Amp}^F(x)]}{2} \right] \quad (\text{by definition of bias and } G) \\ &= \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\mathbb{E}_{U_l} [\text{Bias}_{F \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_p}[\text{Amp}^F(x)]]}{2} \\ &\leq \frac{1}{2} - \frac{(\beta/2)}{2} \quad (\text{by the choice of } p) \end{aligned}$$

Combining the two bounds, we have that $1/2 - \beta/4 \geq 1/2 - \epsilon - 2^{-\Omega(2^n)}$, which implies that $\beta \leq 4\epsilon + O(2^{-n})$. □

12 Nondeterminism is necessary

In this section we show that *deterministic*, monotone, non-adaptive black-box hardness amplifications cannot amplify hardness beyond $1/2 - 1/\text{poly}(n)$. Thus, the use of *nondeterminism* in our results (Section 8) seems necessary. Note that most hardness amplifications, including the one in this paper, are black-box and non-adaptive.

O'Donnell [O'D] proves that any monotone “direct product construction” (i.e. $f'(x_1, \dots, x_k) = C(f(x_1), \dots, f(x_k))$), as in Equation 1) cannot amplify to hardness better than $1/2 - 1/n$, assuming only that the *amplification* works. Our result is orthogonal: we relax the assumption that the hardness amplification is a direct product construction (allowing any monotone nonadaptive oracle algorithm $f' = \text{Amp}^f$), but on the other hand we require that the reduction proving its correctness is also black-box (as formalized in Definition 11.2).

We prove our bound even for hardness amplifications that amplify only balanced functions (i.e. $\beta = 0$ in Def. 11.2).

Theorem 12.1. *For every constant $\delta < 1/2$, if Amp is a black-box 0-bias $[\delta \mapsto (1/2 - \epsilon)]$ -hardness amplification for length n and size $s \leq 2^{n/3}$ such that for every x , $\text{Amp}^f(x)$ is a monotone function of $k \leq 2^{n/3}$ values of f , then*

$$\epsilon \geq \Omega\left(\frac{\log^2 k}{k}\right).$$

The proof of this result follows closely the proof of the negative result on hardness amplification in [Vio1]. The main difference is here we use bounds on the noise stability of monotone functions rather than constant depth circuits.

The following lemma is similar to Lemma 11.5. The only difference is in considering functions F at distance η from f ; this will correspond to perturbing the monotone amplification-function with noise of parameter η .

Lemma 12.2. *Let Amp be as in Definition 11.2 with $\beta = 0$ and $s \leq 2^{n/3}$. Then for any constant $\delta < 1/2$ there is a constant $\eta < 1/2$ such that, for sufficiently large n , the following holds: If $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is any fixed balanced function and $F : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is a random balanced function such that $\text{Dist}(f, F) = \eta$, then*

$$\Pr_F[\text{Dist}(\text{Amp}^f, \text{Amp}^F) \leq 1/2 - \epsilon] \leq \epsilon.$$

Proof. Let $N \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 2^n$. It is easy to see that F is uniform on a set of size $\binom{N/2}{\eta N/2}^2$. The rest is like the proof of Lemma 11.5:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{Dist}(\text{Amp}^f, \text{Amp}^F) \leq 1/2 - \epsilon] &\leq \frac{2^{O(s \log s)} 2^{H(\delta)N}}{\binom{N/2}{\eta N/2}^2} \\ &\leq 2^{O(s \log s)} \cdot (N/2 + 1)^2 \cdot 2^{(H(\delta) - H(\eta))N} \\ &\leq \epsilon. \end{aligned}$$

where the last inequality holds for a suitable choice of $\eta < 1/2$, using the fact that $\delta < 1/2$ is a constant and that $s \leq 2^{n/3}$. \square

Proof of Theorem 12.1. Let η be the constant in Lemma 12.2. The idea is to consider

$$\Pr_{U_l, F, F'} [Amp^F(U_l) \neq Amp^{F'}(U_l)], \quad (8)$$

where F is a random balanced function and F' is a random balanced function such that $Dist(F, F') = \eta$.

By the above lemma, the probability (8) is at least $1/2 - 2\epsilon$.

On the other hand, for every fixed x , $Amp^F(x)$ is a monotone function depending only on k bits of the truth-table of the function F . Since k is small compared to 2^n , the distribution (F, F') induces on the input of $Amp^F(x)$ a distribution very close to $(U_k, U_k \oplus \mu)$, where μ is a noise vector with parameter η . Specifically, it can be verified that the statistical difference between these two distributions is at most $O(k^2/(\eta 2^n))$. Because this value is dominated by $\log^2 k/k$ when $k \leq 2^{n/3}$, and because $Amp^F(x)$ is a *monotone* function of k bits, we may apply Theorem 3.10 to conclude that the probability (8) is at most $1/2 - O(\log^2 k/k)$.

Combining the two bounds, we have that $1/2 - O(\log^2 k/k) \geq 1/2 - 2\epsilon$ and the results follows. \square

13 Impagliazzo and Wigderson's Hardness Amplification

Our framework gives a new proof of the hardness amplification by Impagliazzo and Wigderson [IW1]. This hardness amplification can amplify hardness up to $1/2 - 1/2^{\Omega(n)}$ within $\mathcal{E} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} DTIME(2^{O(n)})$. The improvement over the standard Yao XOR Lemma is that the input length of the amplified function increases only by a constant factor. In this section, we sketch a simple proof of this result using the framework in developed in earlier sections. In particular our proof does not use the Goldreich–Levin hardcore predicate [GL].

The construction of [IW1] uses an *expander-walk* generator $W_k : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$, which uses its seed of length $l = n + O(k)$ to do a random walk of length k (started at a random vertex) in a constant-degree expander graph on 2^n vertices. More background on such generators can be found in [Gol2, Sec 3.6.3]. The construction of [IW1] XORs the expander-walk generator with the (first k outputs of the) indistinguishability-preserving generator from Lemma 10.1:

Definition 13.1. Let $k = c \cdot n$ for a constant $c > 1$. Let $IP''_k : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ be a generator that is indistinguishability-preserving for size $2^{n/c}$ as given by Lemma 10.1. The generator $IW_k : \{0, 1\}^l \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^n)^k$ is defined as

$$IW_k(x, y) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} IP''_k(x) \oplus W_k(y).$$

The seed length of IW_k is $l = O(n)$.

Given a function f that is $1/3$ -hard for size $s = 2^{\Omega(n)}$, the Impagliazzo–Wigderson amplification defines

$$f' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (XOR \circ f^{\otimes k}) \circ IW_k : \{0, 1\}^{O(n)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\},$$

where $k = c \cdot n$ for a constant c that depends on the hidden constant in the $s = 2^{\Omega(n)}$. They prove the following about this construction.

Theorem 13.2 ([IW1]). If there is a function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ in $\mathcal{E} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} DTIME(2^{O(n)})$ that is $1/3$ -hard for size $2^{\Omega(n)}$, then there is a function $f' : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ in \mathcal{E} that is $(1/2 - 2^{-\Omega(m)})$ -hard for size $2^{\Omega(m)}$.

Proof. By Theorem 5.2 there exists a δ' -random function $g : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, where δ' is a constant, such that the hardness of $f' : \{0, 1\}^{O(n)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is $1/2 - \text{ExpBias}[(XOR \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ IW_k] - 2^{-\Omega(n)}$ for circuits of size $2^{\Omega(n)}$.

We now bound the hardness. Whenever some $IW_i(x)$ falls in the set of inputs of density $2 \cdot \delta'$ where the output of g is a coin flip, the bias of $(XOR \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ IW_k$ is 0. Therefore

$$\text{ExpBias}[(XOR \circ g^{\otimes k}) \circ IW_k] \leq \Pr_x[\forall i : IW_i(x) \notin H] \leq 2^{-\Omega(n)},$$

where in the last inequality we use standard hitting properties of expander walks (see e.g. [Gol1] for a proof), and take c to be a sufficiently large constant. \square

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